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I.

INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance has been controversial in America
since 1932, when Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means charged that
most public companies are run not in the interests of their
supposed owners, the shareholders, but of the companies' own
managers. 1 Of course, corporate executives and their operatives
(like corporate lawyers) liked this arrangement. Most academics
did not. Their critiques varied but generally fell into two camps.
One denounced the failure of public companies to maximize
shareholder interests; the other (the "progressives") decried their
failure to serve other corporate constituencies (like employees
and consumers) and the public interest (as they defined it). 2 Each
camp offered diverse solutions to the problem it perceived.

1.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 124 (1932).

2.
See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law
Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 669-70, 672-75 (2002) (introducing the distinction
between the shareholder wealth maximization form of corporate governance and the more
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Oflate the debate has shifted. Although two factions remain,
one devoted to shareholder interests, the second to other
constituencies and the public, many academics in each camp now
defend the status quo as an effective means to the ends it favors.
The supposed champions of shareholders call the dominant
corporate governance mode "director primacy"; 3 progressives dub
it the "team production"4 (or "mediating") model. This astonishing
concurrence of ancient foes prompts the obvious question of
whether both can be right. More fundamentally, with the
memory of Enron, Tyco, and other scandals still fresh, and with
widespread complaints about executive compensation, can it be
that the status quo is truly Nirvana, the best of all possible
corporate governance worlds?
This Article probes both theories and finds them deluded.
Berle and Means are still right: the status quo is not director
primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production, but CEO
primacy-governance by managers largely for their own benefit.
The interests not only of shareholders but of other constituencies
and the public would fare better with shareholder primacy.
"Shareholder voice is an idea that hasn't been tried, not one that
has failed. "5
Part I describes the director primacy and team production
models and explains why they are incompatible and false
accounts of current reality. Part II shows the reality of CEO
primacy and its costs, especially to shareholders. Part III offers a
different and, it is submitted, more accurate description of how
the market has shaped the current state of corporate governance.
Part IV discusses trends that are weakening managerial
domination and may lead to shareholder primacy and the social
consequences of those trends. Part V concludes.

broad community and constituent focus of the progressive governance model); see also
infra notes 47, 53, 105-07, 348-51 and accompanying text. This Article will refer to the
progressives' concept of the public interest without quotation marks, but it should be
understood that the meaning of the term is controversial. See Kostant, supra, at 674-75
(noting the lack of uniformity among progressive scholars and the distracting nature of
labels).
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2006) (defining the "director primacy"
model).
4. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253-54 (1999) (comparing the progressive model to
that of the "team production" or "mediating" model); Kostant, supra note 2, at 667-68
(calling the "team production model" a progressive idea).
5. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 608
(1990).
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II. THE TEAM PRODUCTION AND DIRECTOR PRIMACY MODELS
Under statutes in all states, business corporations are
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors elected
6
by their shareholders. Directors are fiduciaries of the
shareholders and, i:ri theory, charged with promoting their
interests. 7 Proponents of the director primacy model (DPM) deny
8
that directors are really chosen by the shareholders. Indeed,
they claim that to serve shareholder interests, boards must be
9
largely free of shareholder interference. Advocates of the team
production (or mediating) model (TPM) concur that directors are
10
not chosen by shareholders. However, they claim that boards do
not act solely for the benefit of shareholders but balance the
interests of various corporate constituencies and of the public;
11
TPM advocates further claim that this is as it should be.

A. The Director Primacy ·Madel

The Efficient Market for Corporate Governance
Hypothesis. According to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
1.

(ECMH), markets efficiently price securities at the present value
12
of all expected future returns. The relationship between
shareholders and directors entails "agency costs" in the form of
benefits (or "rents") appropriated by the directors as agents for
the shareholders. 13 As a corollary of the ECMH, supporters of the
DPM develop an "efficient market for corporate governance"
hypothesis (EMCGH). The EMCGH posits that the agency costs
of corporate governance are factored into stock prices. If agency

6.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in
its certificate of incorporation."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) ("[A]n annual
meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors.").
See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW, § 4.1.5, at 305 (2000) (setting
7.
forth that courts typically "say that directors owe their duty to the corporation and its
shareholders"); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 291 ("[C]orporate directors are a
unique form of fiduciary .... ").
8.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
9.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003) (addressing the superior role of
the director in the director primacy model of corporate governance).
10.
See infra notes 40-39 and accompanying text.
11.
See infra Part LB.
12.
See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 347-70 (7th ed. 2003) (describing and documenting the ECMH).
13.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976).
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costs were substantial, a corporation would be "more vulnerable
to bankruptcy or hostile takeover." 14 Further, "[b]y increasing the
value of the firm, [managers] would do themselves a favor (most
managers' compensation is linked to the stock market, and they
own stock too)."15 Accordingly: "If investors truly believed greater
shareholder control meant better corporate performance, they
could 'vote with their wallets' by preferring shares in firms that
16
give shareholders more control." Since they do not, "we may
conclude investors do not value these rights." 17 The status quo
18
must be Nirvana for shareholders.
This reasoning has obvious flaws for companies that are
already public. First, it ignores the serious and growing
objections to the ECMH. 19 Further, the alleged market
constraints on managers are often feeble. The threats of
bankruptcy and of hostile takeover do not eliminate rents, which
for most firms are large, but only keep them low enough for the
firm to avoid insolvency or a successful raid. 20 That agency costs
reduce managers' compensation and the value of their shares is
hardly a constraint at all. A self-interested manager will not
desist from grabbing one dollar from the corporate till just
because, as a shareholder, she owns a fraction (typically
minuscule) of that dollar. If she owns one percent of the stock,
one penny of each dollar she appropriates is her own; the other
ninety-nine cents come from the pockets of other shareholders.
Because of these weaknesses, EMCGH theorists rely heavily
21
on initial public offerings (IP0s). Managers of IPO firms are
major shareholders, so they suffer substantial loss if poor
corporate governance reduces the IPO's share price. 22 Further,
14.
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1736.
15.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 205 (1991).
16.
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV.
789, 802 (2007). Likewise, "if shareholder empowerment is as value-enhancing as
[opponents to EMCGH) clain!D, why do we not already see it in the marketplace?"
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1736.
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1737.
17.
18.
See Stout, supra note 16, at 803 (maintaining that shareholders themselves
"prefer weak shareholder rights").
19.
See infra Part III.A.3 (addressing the imperfect nature of information that
influences market decisions). Michael Jensen himself has questioned the ECMH after
concluding that mispricing of securities is common and can persist. Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6-7 (2005).
20.
See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1736 (discussing how "[c)orporate managers
therefore have strong incentives to offer investors attractive governance arrangements" to
reduce its vulnerability to bankruptcy or hostile takeover).
21.
See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
22.
See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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most IPO firms have directors who represent major
nonmanagement shareholders (like venture capitalists) who also
suffer if the IPO price is suboptimal, so they also would demand
that the firm adopt ideal corporate governance rules. 23
One problem with the EMCGH for both IPOs and companies
already public is that the transaction costs of adopting optimal
corporate governance rules and then explaining their value to
24
investors are substantial. Accordingly, EMCGH theorists also
point that state corporate laws are off-the-rack sets of rules;
corporate constituents need to negotiate their own governance
rules only to the extent that state law dissatisfies them. Business
executives, then, are motivated to incorporate in the state with
the best corporate law. To attract corporate franchise fees states
compete in a "race to the top" to offer the best corporate law. 25
Nor is this competition limited to the fifty states. Bainbridge
argues that if critics of the corporate governance status quo were
right, "U.S. corporate governance would be largely dysfunctional.
It is not." 26 If some foreign corporate laws were more efficient
than America's, capital would flow abroad. Foreign corporations
would then enjoy a lower cost of capital than American
companies, leading foreign firms and their nations to higher
productivity and economic growth than America's. In other
words, in addition to a domestic race to the top there is also an
international race to the top. However, in economic growth and
productivity gains, America has consistently exceeded other
27
industrialized nations, and America remains the most attractive
locus for capital investment. We are winning the international
race to the top, so our corporate governance laws must not be
"dysfunctional."
The EMCGH is tidy, appealing, and in some respects true,
but the market for corporate governance is more complex and
28
less efficient than EMCGH allows. Until recently, flaws in the
1559, 1569 (2002) (noting that managers own a majority ofiPO firm shares).
23.
Id.
24. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text (discussing the high costs to
investors of obtaining, processing, and benefiting from information).
25.
This thesis was first proposed in Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275-76 (1977).
26.
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1739.
27. Id. at 1739-40 (quoting Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of
U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 1 (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100).
See Oren Bar-Gill et a!., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INST. &
28.
THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 134 (2006) ("[C]ompetition among states ... produce[s] optimal
rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on management's private
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market for corporate governance persisted because there was no
clearly superior model of corporate governance; now there is. 29
Moreover, international competition for capital is heating up.
Other countries are gaining on us by improving their laws.
Countries like China and India that once offered few investment
opportunities have now joined this race. 30 Thus, inefficiencies in
our corporate governance do not merely shave investors' profits a
little; they now threaten America's appeal to investors and,
accordingly, the health of our economy.

2. Director Primacy as the Efficient Solution. An
organization arises when a task cannot be done by one person or
by several people interacting through contracts. Organizations
delegate authority to agents. Citing the organizational theories of
Kenneth Arrow, Steve Bainbridge says:
Authority-based decisionmaking structures, which are
characterized by a central agency empowered to make
decisions binding on the firm as a whole, tend to arise when
the firm's constituencies face information asymmetries and
have differing interests. Because the corporation
demonstrably satisfies those conditions, vesting the power
of fiat in a central decisionmaker is the essential
characteristic of its governance. 31
According to the DPM, a business with many owners must
delegate not only day-to-day control but plenary authority to a
largely self-perpetuating board of directors; the shareholderowners simply cannot inform themselves about the firm's
operations and coordinate among themselves to control or even
32
choose the board. They need directors to serve as "Platonic
33
guardians. "
This theory defies rational economic behavior. Contracting
parties do submit disputes to third parties; they must do so
because the law permits litigation over contract disputes.
However, shareholders do not surrender control of a business to
someone with little stake in its success. To do that would violate

benefits but not with respect to issues [such as takeover regulation] that have [an effect
on management's private benefits].").
29.
See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
30.
George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J.
CORP. L. 39, 74 (2005).
31.
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1745 (citing KENNETH J. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 68-69 (1974)).
32.
See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 558-59.
33.
Id. at 550-51.

T
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an economic axiom-that an activity is usually handled most
34
efficiently by those with the biggest stake in its success.
Bainbridge's argument for director primacy also contradicts his
own defense of the EMCGH: if shareholders suffer from
"information asym.metries"-they can't evaluate management
decisions-how can capital markets be efficient, especially with
respect to corporate governance rules? The solution to this dilemma
is that his justification for director primacy is false. Principals
(including shareholders) never have all the information or skills of
expert agents (including business managers)-that's ·why experts
are hired. But wise principals do not abandon all control, including
power to fire the agent, leaving the agent to do as he wishes for
whatever compensation he chooses.
Likewise, the DPM is not necessitated by "differing interests"
of "the firm's constituencies." Presumably, by "constituencies"
Bainbridge means the shareholders because he himself says,
[S]areholders are the only corporate constituency with a
residual, unfixed, ex post claim on corporate assets and
earnings .... [Therefore] shareholders have the strongest
economic incentive to care about the size ofthe residual claim,
which means that they have the greatest incentive to elect
directors committed to maximizing firm profitability. 35
The statement clearly imports a unity of shareholder interest.
36
Here, Bainbridge has it right.

B. The Team Production (or Mediating) Model
Advocates of the TPM agree with the DPM theory that boards
operate largely free of shareholder control, but they claim that this
autonomy benefits several corporate constituencies. 37 The TPM
posits that firms need nonshareholder constituents (often called
"stakeholders") to make commitments that would expose them to
38
exploitation if shareholders controlled the firm. Some stakeholders

34.
"[S]hareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize
the value of the firm." Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 1266, 1267-68 (1999). As a result, "shareholders will place a higher
value on being the beneficiaries of director fiduciary duties than will nonshareholder
constituencies." STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOiviiCS 421 (2002).
35.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 613 (2006)
36. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
37.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 253.
38. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667,
685-86 (2003); see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the
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(especially employees) are particularly vulnerable because, unlike
shareholders, they cannot diversifY their investment of (human)
capital or easily shift to another investment as individual
shareholders can by selling their stock. To secure these
commitments, firms must promise to treat stakeholders decently.
However, because performance on each side is so complex and lasts
indefinitely, the mutual commitments cannot be fully specified in
contracts; shareholders could only promise to treat stakeholders
"fairly." Since this commitment is too vague to be legally
enforceable, the shareholders could easily renege; the stakeholders
cannot trust them. 39
To overcome this problem, shareholders cede control to
disinterested directors who act as "mediating hierarchs" to balance
the interests of shareholders and stakeholders. 40 Indeed,
shareholders tie their hands by agreeing to rules that make it
difficult or impossible to replace directors. 41 But, shareholders could
still renege by selling the firm. 42 If this were easily done,
stakeholders would not trust the firm and refuse to make the
commitments it needs. Fortunately for shareholders, the law and
firm-level antitakeover devices make it hard for them to sell the
business. Thus, separation of ownership and control is the best of all
possible worlds for investors; shareholders should welcome their
weakness. 43 The team production model makes corporations more
profitable. 44
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Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAw. 67, 79 (2003)
(alleging "the need to have a body that balances a wide array of competing interests, both
among the shareholders themselves and between shareholders and other constituencies").
39. See Stout, supra note 16, at 805 (stating that investors may malm "opportunistic
attempts to increase 'shareholder value' by changing the corporate rules in the middle of
the game").
40. See id. at 797 ("Stakeholders contemplating making specific investments in
relationships with corporations put more faith in firms run by boards than in firms run by
powerful and possibly opportunistic shareholders."); see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management
Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 956 (1993) (proposing that directors be "neutral
referees" for the various corporate constituencies).
41. See Stout, supra note 38, at 686. The argument is bolstered by a claim that the
corporation became the dominant form of business entity in the nineteenth century
because it locked in capital. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate
Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387,
392-93 (2003); Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can
Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY. Bus. L.J. 1, 4--5 (2004). This claim is demolished by Larry E.
Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock-In?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 523, 524 (2006).
42. See Stout, supra note 38, at 705.
43. See Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 624 ("[S]hareholders will prefer to irrevocably
delegate decisionmaldng authority to some smaller group, as, in the long run, this will
maximize shareholder wealth.").
44. See Kostant, supra note 2, at 671. Some commentators share the ideals of the
TPM's fans but feel that corporations do not now adequately consider the interests of
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C. Problems of the Team Production and Director Primacy
Models
1. The Incompatibility of the Two Models and Their
Internal Inconsistencies. The DPM and the TPM are
incompatible: the DPM posits that the current corporate
governance regime maximizes shareholder welfare; the TPM
claims that it balances shareholder and stakeholder interests.
Some contend that the two do not conflict because stakeholder
and shareholder interests coincide. 45 It is true that market
forces compel firms to treat stakeholders well in order to
maximize share price, 46 but that does not mean the interests of
the two groups are identical. 47 Employees, for example, benefit
if they get all firm income above the costs of goods and outside
services, leaving nothing for shareholders. In European
companies with two-tiered boards, one of which includes
employee representatives (called "co-determination"), the two
groups often clash. 48 Two-tiered boards seem to reduce
shareholder value. 49 Not surprisingly, then, Germany is now

nonshareholder stakeholders; they would give these interests greater weight, but they do
not all agree (or, for some writers, have any idea) how to achieve this goal. See Kent
Greenfield, Saving the World With Corporate Law? 28 (Boston Col!. Law Legal Studies,
Research Paper Series No. 130, 2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=978242 ("The
specifics [of implementation] do not matter as much as does the notion that the board
itself should be a place where more than just a shareholder perspective will be heard.").
45.
See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas
of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2004); S. Ramakrishna
Velamuri & S. Venkataraman, Why Stakeholder and Stockholder Theories Are Not
Necessarily Contradictory: A Knightian Insight, 61 J. Bus. ETIDCS 249, 259 (2005)
(positing that, "[i]n the absense of extensive legislation or detailed corporate codes of
conduct," ethical values can bridge the gap between the normative stakeholder theory
CTPM) and the investor centered model CDPM) when requiring a difficult decision such as
the closing of a factory).
46.
See Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation
in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9, 38 (1999) (postulating that "wealth-maximizing stakeholders at the time the
firm is formed would agree that managers should run the firm so as to maximize the
value of the firm's residual claim or common stock").
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
47.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 745 (2005) (doubting that the interests of the two groups always
coincide).
48.
See Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the
German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 53 (1966) (stating that on such boards "members have
special preoccupations and perspectives of their own"); see also Olubunmi Faleye et al.,
When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11254, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11254 (finding
that labor interests conflict with share value maximization).
49.
See Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of
German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. AsS'N 863, 895 (2004) (concluding that firms
that employ two-tiered boards trade at a significant discount compared to those which

2008]

ACADEMICS IN WONDERLAND

1223

weakening co-determination. 50 There is also evidence that
increased "corporate social responsibility" reduces shareholder
wealth. 51
A variation on the compatibility theme is that the TPM and
DPM differ only in their rhetoric about commitment to
stakeholders. 52 Again, though, shareholder primacy theory posits
fair treatment of stakeholders so as to maximize share price, and it
makes sense to publicize this fact. It is unclear, though, whether the
claims about rhetoric are true---firms do not proclaim their
shareholders' impotence to stakeholders.
No evidence is offered that business behavior has changed, and
corporate concern for the public interest does not seem to have
grown. Indeed, increasing stakeholder rhetoric may "representD a
temporary public relations response to the negative press generated
53
by corporate scandals." Pay for most workers has stagnated. 54 The
environment and consumers seem no better served than before.
Corporate manipulation of Congress and state legislatures with
pots of money seems to have reached new heights (or, more
accurately, depths). If there is any trend away from shareholder
primacy, it is in favor of CEOs, not other stakeholders.

have single-tiered boards).
50.
See Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725,
1754 (2006) (referring to "the recent push in Germany to relax the so-called
codetermination rights entitling employee representatives to half of the supervisory board
seats in large companies").
51.
See Leonardo Becchetti et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Performance: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Listed Companies 15 (Ctr. for Int'l Studies on
Econ. Growth, Working Paper No. 78, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=871402 ("[Social responsibility] seems consistent with the shift in focus from
wealth maximization to a multistakeholders welfare approach."). But see Lee E. Preston &
Douglas P. O'Bannon, The Corporate Social-Financial Performance Relationship: A
Typology and Analysis, 36 Bus. & Soc'y 419, 428 (1997) ("[E]mploying the largest
longitudinal database used to date in this type of research, we find overwhelming
evidence of a positive relationship between social and financial performance indicators in
a sample of large and important U.S. corporations-a finding broadly consistent with the
stakeholder theory of the corporation.").
52.
See Margaret M. Blair, Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language
Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 899-900 (2003); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of
Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L.
675, 702 (2006).
53.
Fairfax, supra note 52, at 698 (declining also "to address the extent to which the
rhetoric can, and likely will, have an impact on corporate conduct"); see also Brian Grow,
The Debate over Doing Good, Bus. WK., Aug. 15, 2005, at 76-77 ("There's no doubt that a
surge in co=unity outreach and do-good deeds is, in large part, a gussied-up bid for good
favor.").
DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP:
54.
WHAT THE DATA SHOW 3 (2007) ("The real hourly wage of a typical worker is only slightly
higher in 2006 than it was in the seventies."), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/growth_failure_04_2007.pdf.
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If the TPM were important to stakeholders, we should
observe a disadvantage of private companies that cannot deploy
such rhetoric. No evidence of this is tendered. Quite the
contrary, private ownership is surging. 55 Indeed, the TPM's fans
contradict themselves. They say "shareholders in close
corporations are often tempted to use their managerial powers
opportunistically."56 Yet, they also purport that in close
corporations, "because there are fewer individuals involved, and
these individuals often interact with each other, reputation and
interpersonal trust can play a larger role in protecting against
opportunism." 57
Another contradiction: It is said that "board governance
offers important advantages in terms of efficient and informed
decisionmaking." 58 However, we also hear that "the existence of
a mediating hierarchy may heighten incentives for team
members to work out conflicts among themselves because the
alternative is kicking the problem upstairs to a disinterestedbut potentially erratic or ill-informed-hierarch."59 Thus the
board is depicted as both "efficient and informed" and as
"erratic or ill-informed."
The interests of various stakeholders conflict with each
other as well as with those of the shareholders. There is not
even an agreed definition of "stakeholders."60 Employees of a
plant could clash with the plant's neighbors over whether to
close the plant because of pollution it emits. Even employees,
usually considered the primary stakeholder group, do not all
have identical interests. Younger workers, for example, care
more about a firm's longterm performance than do older
employees. 61

55. See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds Get Mad, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2007, at
R1 (noting the some fund managers' complaints about the upsurge of management
buyouts).
56. Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 302 (stating that this opportunism leads to the
"exploit[ation of] their fellow shareholders"). However, no reason is stated why
shareholders would not also exploit stakeholders.
57. Stout, supra note 16, at 796 n.18.
58. Id. at 792.
59.
Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 282.
60. See R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and "The Corporate Objective
Revisited", 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 365 (2004) ("[S)takeholder theory can be many things to
many people."); Ronald K Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification
and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 853, 858 (1997) (finding twenty-seven different definitions of "stakeholder").
61.
Cf Sarah Pierce, Gen Y Myths Debunked, ENTREPENEUR.COM, June 1, 2007,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/hurnanresources/managingemployees/articlel79200.html
("[Younger) employees want to have a long-term relationship with a company .... ").
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2. Dubious Premises. Many arguments for shareholder
primacy use stock prices as evidence. 62 Displaying a curious
ambivalence about stock market efficiency, DPJ\IIJTPM theorists
often deny the significance of share price. First, they claim that
market price does not reflect fundamental value. 63 This is
ascribed partly to investors' irrationality; they are "often driven
by emotion and cognitive bias."64 Similarly, they discount the
event studies on which many arguments about corporate
governance rely. 65 This is puzzling because the same writers
premise claims of investor contentment with the status quo in
part on the efficiency of the stock market in valuing corporate
governance and initial public offerings.
Unfortunately, they seem to be wrong in every case. On one
hand, the market is not very efficient in pricing corporate
governance features, especially with regard to IPOs. 66 In general,
though, stock pricing is quite efficient. Although share prices do
not exactly match fundamental value, no measure is better. 67
62.
One example is the loss of share value caused by having a staggered board. See
Lucian A Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
410-11 (2005) (discussing the negative correlation between the presence of staggered
boards and firm value); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 936-39 (2002)
(contending that staggered boards provide the directors too much power to remain
independent from the shareholders, resulting in negative target shareholder value after a
hostile bid); Olubunrni Faleye, Classified Boards, Finn Value, and Managerial
Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 501 (2007) ("[C]lassified boards destroy value by
entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness."); Michael D. Frakes,
Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113, 150-51 (2007) (recognizing
negative effects of classified boards). Similarly, destaggering the board increases share
price. See Faleye, supra, at 514; Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered
Boards? 40-43 (1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908668.
63. See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 Bus. LAw. 1435, · 1439-40 (2005) (claiming that the
relationship between the two is "extremely loose").
64. ld. at 1443; see also HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR:
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INvESTING 3 (2004)
("[T]he primary emotions that determine risk-taking behavior are not greed and fear, but
hope and fear."); Jon E. Hilsenrath, As Two Economists Debate Markets, the Tide Shifts:
Belief in Efficient Valuation Yields Ground to Role of Irrational Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 2004, at Al (comparing the irrationality of investors and the efficient market
theory).
65.
See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 656 (2003) (listing several criticisms of event
studies).
66.
See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text (discussing the high costs to
investors of obtaining, processing, and benefiting from information); see also infra notes
261-73 and accompanying text (discussing inefficiencies in the IPO market).
67.
The public's valuation of a company in the marketplace has unique value,
because it is the only judgment that cannot be manipulated. Various notions of
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Investors are human and therefore not always perfectly rational,
but critics of share price do not show that this affects corporate
governance. Investors have strong incentives to maximize
fundamental value, and evidence indicates that on corporate
governance issues shareholders do so act. 68
If objections to share price were sound, how could we gauge
the success of the mediating board? Its proponents offer no
alternative. 69 Without some yardstick, and without even loose
accountability to any constituency, boards under the DPMITPM
70
are, in effect, unconstrained. Moreover, if directors should serve
many constituencies and investors are irrational, why have
shareholders elect boards at all? Would it not be better to neuter
shareholders and make boards officially self-perpetuating?
Likewise, if the DPMITPM is right that shareholders eschew
control, they should not only be passive but also should oppose
any activism by other shareholders. Assertiveness by some
shareholders should be feared by others as a grab for special
benefits. In fact, though, shareholder activism is growing, and
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value based on concepts like earnings per share, book value, rate of return on
reinvested capital, and the like are based on accounting principles that are so
highly flexible that they have limited significance.
ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE 55 (1995); see also Henry
Manne, Remarks on the Lewis & Clark Law School Business Law Forum: Behavioral
Analysis of Corporate Law: lnstntction or Distraction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 169,
172, 175 (2006) ("[C]ritics like Professor Stout are simply claiming too much .... [M]ere
'irrationality' on the part of some stock market participants cannot foil an otherwise
efficient market."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices:
The New Corporate Governance Paradigm 70-90 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 301, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928100 (stating that stock prices
have become more "informative" in recent years).
68.
See infra notes 116, 128--57 and accompanying text.
69.
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006) ("A major drawback to stakeholder
theory is that it lacks a specific maximand to guide managerial discretion. To the extent
that the interests of different stakeholders conflict, the stakeholder model offers no
principled basis for choosing among them."); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization,
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9
(2001) (arguing that the lack of a corporate objective is likely to result in "confusion,
conflict, [and] inefficiency"). See generally Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The
Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 350, 353-56 (2004) (arguing that
shareholder value versus stakeholder value should be the preferred corporate objective).
70.
Berle recognized this situation as a consequence of separation of ownership and
control. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) ("The point is that [corporate managers] need recognize
no other."); see also JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: TriE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF
PROFIT AND POWER 34 (2004) (noting that if directors are responsible to several
constituencies, they play them off against each other); Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta
Cestone, Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment, .16 J. ECON. &
IVIGMT. STRATEGY 741, 743 (2007) ("CEOs who can rely on anti-takeover defenses and
dominated boards do not need stakeholders' support to buttress their positions.").
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even passive shareholders welcome the efforts of others. 71
Contrary to claims that investors tie their own hands,
shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance. 72
In sum, the DPMITPM never has accorded with reality and does
so even less as time passes.
DPMITPM scholars refuse to view shareholders as owners of
the corporation for whom directors are agents: "the way corporate
law actually works in practice is consistent with the notion that
directors are independent hierarchs whose fiduciary obligations
run to the corporate entity itself and only instrumentally to any
of its participants.'m Directors are not agents because "they are
not subject to direct control or supervision by anyone, including
the firm's shareholders.''74 They are, instead, "a unique form of
fiduciary who, to the extent they resemble any other form,
perhaps most closely resemble trustees." 75 Further, "American
law ... grants directors tremendous discretion to sacrifice
shareholders' interests in favor of management, employees, and
creditors .... "76 Statutes in over half the states expressly allow
boards to weigh nonshareholder interests. 77
True, directors are not precisely agents of the shareholders,
but the claim that they enjoy "tremendous discretion to sacrifice
shareholders' interests in favor of' other stakeholders is grossly
misleading. AS suggested by their own characterization of
directors as resembling trustees for the shareholders, directors
are fiduciaries of the shareholders and no one else. Most
constituency statutes apply only to a takeover attempt, a rarity
for any company and one most never face. 78 And these laws are
absent in nearly half the states, including Delaware, the
. 79
kingpm.
f

71. See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors 3, 13, 15 (May 2007) (working
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=910548 (confirming the hypothesis that
shareholder voting is related to firm performance); see also infra notes 287-90 and
accompanying text.
73. Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 289.
74. ld. at 290.
75. ld. at 291.
76. ld.
77. See id. at 303 n.l44 (stating that twenty-eight states allow directors to consider
nonshareholder interests); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 n.1, 587 n.33
(1992) (listing statutes).
78. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (McKinney 2003) (outlining New York's
constituency statute).
79. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 27-28 (1992) (noting that although twenty-nine
states have constituency statutes, Delaware is not among them).
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True also, the legal devices by which shareholders can call
the board to account-specifically election and removal of
directors and derivative suit-are imperfect, especially when the
80
directors' acts are not self-interested. In legal doctrine, however,
directors are fiduciaries of the shareholders only. 81 Occasionally,
directors are held to have breached their duties without any
82
conflict of interest. More important, the law often proclaims
shareholder primacy. A key purpose of the Securities Exchange
Act was to realize shareholder democracy. 83 Delaware courts
recognize that the shareholder franchise is the linchpin of
corporate legitimacy. 84
The looseness of the directors' duties and restrictions on
derivative suits are defended on the theory that tighter
standards would breed excessive caution in directors fearful of
personal liability and deter the best candidates from serving on
boards. This reasoning is pure speculation, though; there is no
evidence of its truth, and experience seems to show that an
insistence on minimal care and competence does not empty a
field of qualified practitioners.
It is true that not every step taken to increase shareholder
power has produced benefits. That only shows, however, that the
best means of implementing shareholder primacy are still
unclear. Many enhancements of shareholder influence do
generate gains. 85 Shareholder democracy is a work in progress.
The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that governments
"deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed."86
80. See Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 292-315 (analyzing derivative suits and
voting rights under the "mediating hierarchy model" and determining that such
shareholder powers are "so weak as to be virtually meaningless").
81. E.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 704 & n. 10 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(noting the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders by directors).
82.
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176
(Del. 1986) (forbidding the board to weigh nonshareholder interests in a takeover bid
except to benefit shareholders); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985)
(holding board liable for breach of the duty of care when it accepted a takeover bid); Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N. W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (forbidding the board to withhold
dividends and devote corporate funds to the public interest).
83. "Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity
security .... " H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934). The goal was to prevent "the
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders." Id. at 14, quoted in Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970),
and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); see also S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 7377 (1934) (observing the importance of stockholder knowledge in relation to proxy voting).
84. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (''The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.").
85. See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Yet, it took over 100 years before women obtained the right to
vote and nearly 200 years before African-Americans were really
able to vote in many states. 87 Shareholder democracy has not
been realized, but it is widely recognized as the holy grail of
corporate governance, and changes in the law and in actual
corporate behavior are bringing us closer to that ideal. 88

3. The Team Production Model Does Not Benefit
Stakeholders. A board of "mediating hierarchs" is not necessary
to win stakeholder loyalty. To induce employees or suppliers to
make firm-specific investments, the firm can pay their out-ofpocket costs 89 or offer rewards for making the investments. 90
Employees care not only about material rewards, but also (maybe
even more) about procedural fairness. 91 But a mediating board is
not needed to achieve this; investors seeking maximum share
value have an incentive to maximize the efficiency of employees
and to provide fair procedures that promote it. 92
Some claim that the TPM prevents takeovers by an acquirer
who will fire employees or curtail their pay or perquisites.
However, most acquirers do not cut employment or
compensation. 93 That is not surprising-an acquirer striving to
maximize share value has as much incentive as any equity owner
to treat employees well. Indeed, better management or synergies
87.
U.S. CONST. amend. XN. See generally McKen Carrington, Book Review, 26 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 107, 110 n.11 (2000) (reviewing MERLINE PITRE, IN STRUGGLE AGAINST
JIM CROW: LULU WHITE AND THE NAACP 1900-1957 (1998)).
88.
See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text.
89.
See Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J.
POL. ECON. 9, 18 (1962) (discussing the costs and benefits of specific investments in
employees); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 548-49 (2006).
See Lee, supra note 89, at 549 (mentioning profit-sharing formulas and
90.
performance standards as possible inducements).
See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
91.
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 581, 615-16 (2002)
(discussing findings of behavioral psychologist Tom Tyler). Significantly, Tyler does not
say that employees care about the composition of the board; tlley care about how they are
treated, not who makes the decisions.
92.
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 863 (1992) ("In tile long run, shareholders can't
systematically exploit other 'stakeholders' in the corporate enterprise" because doing so
would damage the shareholders' own interests.). See generally Olubunmi Faleye & Emery
Trahan, Is What's Best for Employees Best for Shareholders. 7, 13, 24 (May 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888180 ("It appears that
the benefits of creating an employee-friendly environment significantly outweigh the costs
and that what is best for employees is, at least, good for shareholders.").
93.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT ON
MAss LAYOFFS IN 1988, at 2 (1989) (finding that fewer than 5% of major layoffs resulted
from changes in firm ownership).
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stemming from a merger often benefit the acquired firm's
employees. 94 Thus, when management thwarts a takeover, it is as
likely to be hurting other employees as helping them. On the
other side, managers of the acquired company often receive side
payments in mergers. 95
A mediating board is not just unnecessary to protect
stakeholders but is also a dubious way to do it. There is no
reason to think that independent directors care about
96
stakeholders more than shareholders do.
Entrenched
97
managers may pay their employees more, but the excessive
compensation of autocratic executives alienates workers. 98
Consider also Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, whose boards slept
while mismanagement destroyed their companies. 99 The losses
suffered by shareholders were huge, but few had their lives
destroyed as did many employees. These boards were not
unusually insensible; they were quite typical. 100 Directors often
play along with auctions of financially troubled companies that
favor insiders to the detriment of creditors. 101 "Mediating"
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94.
Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor,
in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9, 11, 23 (Alan J. Auerbach, ed.,
1988) ("In general, we find small (and sometimes positive) changes in wages and
employment following an acquisition.")
95.
See GEVURTZ supra note 7, § 7.1.1(c), at 637.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59
96.
Bus. LAw. 43, 59 (2003) ("The interests of directors and executives are even less aligned
with the interest of stakeholders than they are aligned with the interests of
shareholders .... [T]here is no reason to expect that reduced accountability to
shareholders would translate into increased attention to stakeholders.").
97.
See Henrik Cronqvist et al., Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
12, 24 (Fisher Call. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2007-03-010, 2007), available at
http://ssrn/com/abstract= 845844 (reporting the results of an empirical study).
98.
See James D. Cox, Fair Play for Chief Executive Officers, in LAW AND CLASS IN
AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 99, 114 (P.D. Carrington & T. Jones eds., 2006);
see also infra note 198 and accompanying text.
99.
See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 163-65, 183-84 (2005) (describing
the inaction of the directors as their companies collapsed).
100.
See PATRICK A. REARDON, HARD LESSONS FOR MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS AND
PROFESSIONALS 71-72 (2003) (extolling the qualifications of Enron's Audit and
Compliance Committee members); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1333-34 (2002) (stating that Enron's board
followed widely accepted "good governance practice"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial
Reactions, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002) (noting how Enron had "a splendid board
on paper"); Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 495, 504--05 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) ("(T]he
Enron board was on the scene and, for the most part, taking most of the steps we ask a
board to take.").
101.
See Gretchen Morgenson, 'For Sale' May Mean 'You Lose,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2007, § 3, at 1; see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales,
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directors are less watchdogs for stakeholders than lapdogs for
management.
If reassurance of stakeholders is a real problem, a contract
seems a better solution than the "mediating" board. A promise of
decent treatment cannot be fully specified, but many
commitments can be spelled out, as they are in collective
bargaining agreements. When this method of protection is
impractical, it may be wise to vest discretion in a third party, but
a traditional arbitrator or mediator seems better for this than the
modern board. These arrangements are common not only in labor
agreements but also in all kinds of relational contracts. 102 Their
frequent use suggests that a need to reassure stakeholders is not
the reason for shareholder impotence.
The TPM is also alleged to improve corporate compliance
with law and social responsibility. 103 Unaffiliated directors are
supposedly less likely to break the law since they will not profit
from illegal acts. 104 However, champions of the TPM offer no
evidence that nonpublic, shareholder-controlled companies are
less law-abiding than director primacy companies.
As for other aspects of "social responsibility," a glaring
difficulty is that the concept is hopelessly vague. Beyond obeying
the law, how should a board balance such competing concerns as
the environment, philanthropy, employees, and consumers? In a
democracy, pursuit of goals outside the market with other
people's money is supposed to be handled by elected officials.
Directors eschewing profit maximization do not pursue the same
goals Americans would choose democratically. Now, most boards
are dominated by the CEO, so corporate philanthropy favors the
pet charities of CEOs. 105 Corporate gifts come from the pockets of
106 MICH. L. REv. 1, 32-34 (2007) (discussing possible explanations for below-market
sales, including personal incentives to company insiders like CEOs).
102. See, e.g., George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAW.
45, 74-75 (2002) (describing the use of arbitration and mediation in strategic business
alliances).
103. See Kostant, supra note 2, at 684-703.
104. Peter Kostant claims that mediating directors are more likely to obey the law
because they are less dominated by the CEO. See id. at 684, 688. It is not clear to what he
is comparing the TPM. However, he admits that the TPM is "a dubious model" if this
assumption is not true. Id. at 684. In fact, it is not true. See infra note 347 and
accompanying text.
105. See W.O. Brown et. al., Corporate Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 855,
855-57 (2006); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: "Independent" Directors
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 72, 78 (2006-07) [hereinafter
Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits]; Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They
Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1999); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
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taxpayers as well as shareholders because gifts are tax
deductible and reduce corporate taxes.
When America wants corporations to pursue goals other
than profit, it can pass laws (environmental laws, for example)
dictating such goals or raise corporate taxes. The problem for
progressives is that American democracy rejects their program.
They hope the TPM will sneak that program in through the back
door. 106 It is ironic that progressives despair of democracy and yet
favor unelected, unaccountable elite. It is also a false hope to
grant social power to CEO-dominated boards with, as Adolf Berle
put it, no more than a "pious wish" that something good will
107
come of it. Reducing incentives for efficiency will not advance
the progressive goals.
Most directors now have little personal stake in firm
performance, but shareholders have a keen incentive to
maximize profits and share price. In a market economy, the
"invisible hand" guides those seeking personal profit also to
108
benefit others
in many ways, including better jobs, better
quality and price of goods and services, and higher tax receipts.
At least when the firm is solvent, "profit maximization benefits
all participants in the corporate venture and promotes societal
welfare." 109 Much of the innovation and employment growth m
America comes from nonpublic companies. 110 The efficiency of
shareholder primacy helps explain this phenomenon.
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UCLA L. REV. 579, 591 (1997) (claiming that "in most public corporations senior executive
officers still exert extraordinary influence over ... the selection of beneficiary
organizations").
See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
106.
1259, 1271 (1982) (stating that progressives seek to change corporate governance laws
because they have "largely failed in implementing their objectives through the political
processes"); Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 33.
107.
Berle, supra note 70, at 1368.
108.
See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 485 (Modern Library 2000) (1776)
(the individual "intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention"); Jeffrey G.
Mcintosh, The End of Corporate Existence: Should Boards Act as Mediating Hierarchs? A
Comment on Yalden, in THE CORPORATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37, 72 (Anita I. Anand &
William F. Flanagan eds., 2003) (stating that following the mediating model would reduce
innovation and risk-taking); Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 69, at 353 ("Only residual
cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize the total value of the firm.").
109.
Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1497 (1993).
110.
"[S]mall businesses generate 60 to 80 percent of the net new jobs added each
year, employ half of all private sector employees, and pay 44.3 percent of the total U.S.
private payroll." DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H. COMl'II. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 108TH CONG., SMALL
BUSINESS RECORD REPORT 1 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/smbiz/democrats
/2004yearendreport%20docFINAL. pdf.
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In a global economy with mobile capital, profit
maximization is desirable not only for these benefits of the
"invisible hand" but also because it draws capital investment to
the nation. The importance of this draw is evidenced by the
faster economic growth in America than in other countries. 111
However, many countries are now making themselves more
attractive to investors; the United States cannot smugly assume
112
continued superiority.
In Conan Doyle's story, Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes
solves a crime in part by noting the dog that didn't bark. 113 If the
TPM were valid, stakeholders would be treated better by public
firms hewing to that model than by private firms with
shareholder-chosen boards. Likewise, employees would suffer
when a public company goes private in a leveraged buyout.
Employees, then, should flee such companies. No evidence of
this is offered. Nor is there evidence that private firms are less
solicitous of customers, suppliers, the environment, or the
communities in which they operate. Like the dog that didn't
bark, this absence is telling; it belies the TPM.
4. The Laclr, of Intra-Shareholder Conflicts and Investor
Myopia. Some claim that an autonomous board is needed to
mediate conflicts not only between shareholders and other
114
constituents but also among the shareholders themselves. The
concern is grossly exaggerated. Investors do vary in many
111.
See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1739-40 ("U.S. productivity gains in the past
decade have been exceptional, and the U.S. stock market has consistently outperformed
other world indices over the last two decades." (quoting Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N.
Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 1
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100)).
112. See infra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
113. When Holmes refers to "the curious incident of the dog in the night-time,"
Inspector Gregory says, "The dog did nothing in the night-time." Holmes replies: "That
was the curious incident." ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE
SHERLOCK HOLMES§ 1, at 1, 23 (Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1930) (1893).
114.
See !man Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93 (2006) (claiming various conflicts of interests among
shareholders); Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1751, 1754-57 (alleging danger of special
interest shareholders); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and
Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 368-70 (1991) (noting
shareholder differences over time horizons, risk preferences, and expectations for the
future); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 38, at 78 ("[M]any institutional investors and
other activist investors have competing interests that may conflict with the best interests
of the public corporation and its shareholder body and other constituencies talmn as a
whole."); Stout, supra note 16, at 794 ("Board power ... protect[s] shareholders from each
other."); see also Stout, supra note 63, at 1447-49 (claiming that highly diversified
shareholders may oppose share-price maximization in some firms because of their
interests in others).
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ways, 115 but nearly all shareholders want to maximize firm
value. 116
More specifically, some allege that large shareholders extract
special benefits-or would do so under a regime of shareholder
primacy. 117 However, a large shareholder has financial incentives to
monitor firm performance and· to work to optimize it, and
institutional investors have the sophistication to perform these
functions. 118 Any large shareholder that sought special benefits
would be checked by other large shareholders. 119 Again, Silver Blaze
is instructive. 120 If shareholders were as divided as public voters,
shareholder meetings would be as contentious as political elections
and corporations (like political, religious, and civic organizations)
would pursue varying goals. Major institutional shareholders and
115. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 69, at 661 ("(I]nvestors vary considerably among such
dimensions as the time frame over which they invest, the extent to which they trade
versus passively holding the corporation's stock, their degree of diversification, the extent
to which they hold non-equity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging
positions that they hold, and so forth.").
116. "Although a wide range of precatory resolutions are put forward [for
shareholder vote], the ones that obtain majority support are those ... that are widely
viewed by financial institutions as serving shareholder interests." Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1799 (2006); see also
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 469 n.16 ("Although investors have somewhat different
preferences on issues such as dividends and the like, they are generally united by a desire
to maximize share value."); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 466 (1991) (stating that "the
potential for conflict between large and small shareholders will likely be minimal"). Some
diversified shareholders may care less how an act by a firm in which they are invested
will affect itself than how it will affect another firm in which they are invested, but the
overall impact of such concems is small. See Jarrad Harford et al., Conflicts of Interests
Among Shareholders: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions 1, 4-5 (MIT Sloan Sch. of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4653-07, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000421
(discussing cares and concerns of "shareholder cross-holdings"). Existence of even a small
impact is rather speculative. Direct evidence of shareholders opposing value-maximizing
acts in a firm because of their interests in other firms is extremely rare.
117. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access
Proposal 12-13 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=470121 ("[I]nstitutional
investors may abuse their control by self-dealing and other forms of over-reaching.... If
the board becomes more beholden to the interests of large shareholders, it may become
less concerned with the welfare of smaller investors.").
118. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 10, 14 (1991) ("If an owner could take 25% stock positions in a few firms, it might
find it worthwhile to assemble a staff with expertise to monitor effectively."); see also
Laura L. Frieder & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Executive Compensation and Investor
Clientele 5 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.corn/
abstract=937115 (stating that empirical tests show that indirect executive compensation
is lower in companies with more large investors).
119. See MARKJ. ROE, STRONG lVIANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 244-45 (1994) (stating that multiple intermediaries can
form "countercoalition[s]").
120. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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shareholder advisory services would be addressing the issue and the
business press would be discussing it. In fact there is no evidence
for any ofthis. 121
Shareholders' behavior confirms their common purpose. In this
way they resemble baseball fans. Fans have varied political,
religious, and social attitudes, but at a game they table their
differences and unite to root for their team. They often display great
camaraderie with people with whom they otherwise have little in
common. Among shareholders, even hedge funds, which are
sometimes portrayed as threats to other investors/22 are actually
welcomed. 123 If institution of real shareholder primacy did expose
particular conflicts of interest, these could be handled by narrowly
focused rules rather than by scrapping shareholder primacy
altogether. 124
Some charge that shareholders, including institutional
investors, focus unduly on short-term results. 125 This obsession with
121. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1996)
("[S]hareholders do not have the kinds of disputes one would expect if they were a diverse
group of Americans engaged in a struggle to make corporations in their images .... ").
Most shareholder disputes that do occur are initiated by special interest shareholders
whose motions are overwhelmingly rejected. See supra note 116 (quoting Lucian Bebchuk
on shareholder voting).
122. See Andrew M. Kulpa & Butzel Long, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing:
Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate
Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 4, 4 (2005); Memorandum from Martin
Lipton et al. to Clients, Be Prepared for Attacks by Hedge Funds (Dec. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk122205-02.pdf.
123. See Chris Young, Hedge Funds to the Rescue, Bus. WK., July 31, 2006, at 86
(stating that hedge funds have become "the catalyst" for proxy fights, leading
shareholders in opposing value-impairing deals); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance 1 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 139/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907
("The market reacts favorably to hedge fund activism, as the abnormal return upon
announcement of potential activism is in the range of 5-7 percent, with no apparent
reversal in the subsequent year."); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control 53 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881 (stating
that traditional institutions are happy to "tag along'' with activist hedge funds). Further,
"target firms see moderate improvement in operational performance and considerably
higher CEO turnover after activism." Brav, supra, at 1.
124. For example, some board seats are held by banks that are major lenders to the
company and that also control the voting of many company shares through their trust
departments. See Joao A.C. Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, The American Keiretsu and
Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on Nonfinancials' Corporate Boards, 80 J.
FIN. ECON. 419, 436 (2006) (discussing banks' ability to vote stock held in trust). If these
banks are shown to misuse their board seats, they could be barred from boards.
125. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 38, at 78 (stating that some investors "may
seek to push the corporation into steps designed to create a short-term pop in the
company's share price"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
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short-term results creates a conflict between current shareholders,
who profit from "earnings manipulation," and future
shareholders. 126 Director primacy, then, insulates managers from
"short-termism," freeing them to build long-term value.
The charge of short-termism raises four questions. First, is it
true? "[F]or all the anecdotal evidence of short-termism and its
effects, there is not a lot of empirical data to back it up."127 "[N]o one
has demonstrated that the long/short phenomenon exists."128
Although some institutions do turn over their portfolios rapidly,
there is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence that this makes
their attitudes on corporate strategy any different from those of
129
long-term shareholders. No evidence is offered that profitable
long-term business opportunities go begging, as should happen if
myopia were rampant. The accusations first surfaced during the
1970s and early 1980s when America's economy was stagnant and
Japan, Germany, and other countries seemed to be performing
better. 130 However, for some years now America has outpaced its
economic rivals, so the whole claim seems dubious. 131
Second, if there is a problem, does it stem from defective
corporate governance? Some charge that American companies pass
up business opportunities promising returns that foreign firms
accept. The reason, however, may be that the cost of capital is
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006).
126. See Patrick Bolton et al., Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive
Compensation in Speculative Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 725 (2005).
127.
Joe Nocera, A Defense of Short-Termism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at Cl.
"Baruch Lev, the well-known accounting professor at New York University ... scoffs at
the notion that short-termism is even a problem." Id. Iman Anabtawi points to efforts of
hedge-fund managers to have MCI, Inc. sold to Qwest Communications, the highest
bidder, rather than to merge with Verizon Communications, which the board believed
"offered MCI shareholders better long-term synergies." Anabtawi, supra note 114, at 58283. However, Anabtawi offers no evidence that the board was right and the hedge funds
wrong.
128. Roe, supra note 118, at 13.
129. "If a governance provision does not serve long-term shareholder value, its
adoption will likely reduce short-term prices (which reflect expectations about long-term
value) ... ." Bebchuk, supra note 116, at 1802; see also Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakrnan, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U.
L. REV. 521, 532 (2002) ("Under elementary principles of finance, even short-term
investors have an incentive to maximize the firm's long-term value .... ");Roe, supra note
118, at 13 ("The long/short controversy posits a market failure. After all, institutions
should know how to discount long-term value to present value.").
See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR
130.
BUSINESS MYOPIA 1-4 (1991) (discussing the United States's declining competitiveness in
the 1970s and 1980s compared to Japan and Germany).
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1739-40 (quoting Bengt Holmstrom & Steven
N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 1
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100.
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higher for American firms (which is not necessarily bad). 132 If so, the
causes may lie outside corporate governance, such as government
tax fuJ.d fiscal policies and Americans' propensity to spend much and
save little. 133
Third, if short-termism exists and stems at least partly from
defective corporate governance, is the defect pressure from shortterm shareholders? Despite charges by CEOs of shareholder
obsession with quarterly earnings, high institutional ownership
is not associated with lower research and development (R&D)
investment. 134 Share prices rise when companies increase
R&D. 135 Share prices do not react positively to accounting
changes that increase reported earnings but not cash flow. 136
Price to earnings ratios vary widely; obviously, investors consider
factors other than current earnings. This is also evident from the
successful public offerings by firms with little or no history of
profits. Strong shareholder rights are associated with higher
share, bond, and asset values, higher levels of investment, and
higher firm valuation. 137 Even the Business Roundtable seems to
concede excessive shareholder power does not cause corporate
•
138
myopia.
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132.
See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 11 (alleging a "higher cost of capital in the
United States" which "explain[s] a lot about short-term business behavior"). Cheap capital
is generally desirable; it allows more investment, which creates more jobs and wealth.
However, in countries with weak shareholder rights, returns on investment may be less
than the cost of capital. See Klaus Gugler et al., Corporate Governance and the Returns on
Investment, 47 J.L. & ECON. 589, 591-92 (2004). In that case, too much investment may
be detrinlental to investors. That would be troubling in a country like America where
investment in securities is widespread and an important source of income for a growing
number of retirees. See Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on
Retirement, 12 ELDER L.J. 245, 270-75 (2004) (discussing the dangers of retirees'
increasing reliance on stock investments).
133.
But see JACOBS, supra note 130, at 14 (arguing that these causes have negligible
impact on costs of capital face by competing firms in the same market).
134.
See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL
OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INvESTMENTS (1985).
135.
See Randall Woolridge, Competitive Decline and Corporate Restructuring: Is a
Myopic Stock Market to Blame?, 1 J. APPLIED. CORP. FIN. 26, 26-36 (1988). See generally
John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and
the Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 399, 415 (1985) (comparing the effect of
budget increases and decreases in several areas, including research and development).
136.
See Robert S. Kaplan & Richard Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting
Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 225, 245 (1972) (finding accounting
changes to have no statistically significant effect upon share prices and concluding,
"Earnings manipulation may be fun, but its profitability is doubtful").
137.
See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
138.
DAN KREHMEYER ET AL., CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY & Bus.
ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORPORATE ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE:
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS, AsSET MANAGERS,
INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE 2 (2006), available at
http://www.cfapubs.org/doilpd:f/10.2469/ccb.v2006.nl.4194
(recommending
several
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201

If myopia is the problem, powerful executives rather than
shareholders may be its source. Insulation from shareholder
pressure does not seem to produce the long-term focus that the
short-term theory would predict. Companies that adopt takeover
defenses actually reduce R&D. 139 "[L]ess monitoring by owners
makes managers invest less rather than more in order to enjoy the
quiet life."140 The higher cost of capital to American companies may
stem in part from an aversion of .American executives to debt, which
. ch eaper than eqm'ty. 141
IS
Equity may be more costly in the United States partly because
of the separation of ownership and control. "Sometimes [myopic
behavior] occurs when managers hold little stock in their companies
and are compensated in ways that motivate them to take actions to
increase accounting earnings rather than the value of the firm." 142
Small ownership is typical: "The average CEO of a Fortune 500
company owns about one-fourth of [one] percent of his company's
stock."143 A CEO may inflate the firm's stock price by false
disclosures and then dump his own shares before the truth
emerges. 144 This is but one of many forms of self-serving behavior by
CEOs. 145 Thus, some label CEOs' claims of managing for the long
term ''bogus." 146
The fourth question: If short-term shareholders are indeed
a problem, is director primacy the solution? If shareholders are
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changes, including aligning executive compensation with long-term goals and ending the
practice of issuing quarterly earnings guidance, none of which would weaken shareholder
influence).
139. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 249 n.4 (citing a study by the SEC's Office of
Economic Analysis).
140. See 0yvind B!ilhren et al., Corporate Governance and Real Investment Decisions
3 (2007) (unpublished EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=891060 (citing their own empirical findings and Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial
Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1047 (2003)).
141. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 192 ("Contrary to popular belief, American
companies are actually underleveraged by international standards.").
142. Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGET: THE lJ';lPACT OF THE HOSTILE T~OVER 314, 320 (John
C. Coffee, Jr., Louis Lowenstein, Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988); see also JACOBS,
supra note 130, at 194--96.
143. JACOBS, supra note 130, at 64.
144. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
145. See generally infra notes 183-207 and accompanying text (discussing the
detriments of CEO domination).
146.
Nocera, supra note 127; see also MATTEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET
SHORT-TERMISM 8 (2006) (reporting that "most business managers stated that they would
rather forgo an investment promising a positive return on capital than miss the quarterly
earnings expectations of their analysts and financiers"); John R. Graham et al., The
Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting 17 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10550, 2004).
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obsessed with the short term, it may be because they lack
information about and control over the long term. 147 Director
primacy may be more a cause of than a cure for short-termism.
Shareholder power may actually counter managerial myopia. 148
As for conflicting interests among shareholders, even
assuming that holders of a small fraction of a firm's stock
could profit from manipulating reported earnings and then
dumping their stock at an inflated price, this course of action
could not work for holders of large blocks. 149
Some commentators have trumpeted one horror story. 150
The proposed acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals by Mylan
Laboratories was opposed by a shareholder who had voting
rights in many shares of Mylan but had hedged away all
economic interest in those shares and held a big equity stake
in King. 151 The specter conjured is that "pure" shareholders
would be outvoted by investors with a conflicting interest.
However, such ploys are rare 152 and likely to remain so because
the amount of stock available for such gambits is limited. 153
More important, because a borrower of shares "must pay a
'rebate"' to the lender, the lenders know the risks of lending
and charge for them. 154 In short, "stock lending is, to an
important degree, self-policing."155 Voting rules for a few ploys
like short sales and record date capture trades may need to be

147. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 10 ("Lack of communication prevents investors
from understanding management's long-term goals and objectives."); id. at 36 ("The
problem lies in the quality of information the market uses to value companies, not in the
greediness or impatience of investors.").
148. See Alex Edmans, Blockholders, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia 29
(Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946669.
149. Bolton et al. posit that some investors are irrational and, in particular,
overconfident. Bolton et al., supra note 126, at 726-28. The number and holdings of such
investors must be small, though. Their behavior may explain the few ''bubbles" featured
by Bolton et al., but they cannot significantly influence stock prices generally. Large net
sales would quickly decimate a company's stock price. Thus earnings manipulation cannot
succeed for more than a few small shareholders, and it is unlikely that a few small
shareholders could exert much influence under a regime of shareholder primacy. See infra
notes 353-54 and accompanying text (describing a proposal to institute shareholder
primacy).
150. See Anabtawi, supra note 114, at 591-92; Stout, supra note 16, at 794--95.
151. High River Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 490 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
152. See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund
Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 721 (2007).
153. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 1,
25-26 (2006) ("[O]nly a small percentage of most common stock is available to be
borrowed and an investor will be limited inherently by the supply.").
154. Id. at 27-28.
155. I d. at 25.
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tweaked, 156 but the problem is far too small to justify defanging
shareholders.
Shareholder control would not be perfect-no system
dependent on human beings can be-but it would be far better
than the CEO-dominated boards we have now. In corporate
governance, shareholder control may be, as Churchill said of
democracy, "the worst form of Government except all those other
forms that have been tried from time to time." 157
III. REALITY: CEO DOMINATION AND ITS COSTS

A. The Reality: Not Director Primacy but CEO Domination
Despite the claims for the DPMITPM, the evidence is
overwhelming that most boards are passive, dominated by CEOs
who exert their power in their own interests. 158 This insight is far
from novel. In addition to Berle and Means, seventy years ago
William 0. Douglas published an article titled Directors Who Do
Not Direct. 159 He later characterized most outside directors as
"business colonels of the honorary type-honorary colonels who
are ornamental in parade but fairly useless in battle." 160 That
161
passivity persists today.
156. See Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and
Financial Innovation 50-51 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
06-21, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931254 (describing some problem
situations); see also Briggs, supra note 152, at 706-08 (urging higher disclosure
requirements). These problems arise only because "hedge funds are ... reacting to the
failure of other institutions to exercise their franchise for the benefit of all shareholders."
Partnoy & Thomas, supra at 52.
157.
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 202 (4th ed. 1992) (quoting Winston
Churchill).
158.
"The most significant problem facing corporate America today is the
management-dominated, passive board of directors." Charles M. Elson, Director
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The History of a Symptom and a
Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 127 (1996). See generally Glyn A. Holton, Investor Suffrage
Movement, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 19 (2006) (stating that "[r]ecent market crashes and
financial scandals are symptomatic of a capitalism in which shareholders have lost
control over the corporations they own" and urging steps to make shareholder voting more
effective); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 898-903, 913-17 (1996)
(cataloging the many ways that CEOs dominate outside directors). Sophisticated
investors realize this. See Rachel McTague, Advisers, High-Net- Worth Investors Think
Boards Serve Executives, Survey Says, 39 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1662, 1662 (2007) ("A
survey of more than 200 investment advisers and high-net-worth investors found that the
respondents clearly perceive that corporate boards primarily answer to management,
rather than shareholders.").
159.
William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934).
WILLIA.l'II 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 46 (1940).
160.
161.
See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How
Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 847 (1999) ("Both
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Boards are passive for many reasons. Most board openings
are filled on recommendation of the CE0. 162 Of course, they
don't pick anyone expected to rock the boat. The most popular
choice is other CEOs. 163 They enhance a board's prestige and
exude independence: presumably one CEO will not kowtow to
another. Reality is otherwise. A CEO wants directors on "his"
(rarely "her") board to defer to him, so when he serves as an
164
outside director he defers to that firm's CE0. The incentive
to do so is stronger when, as often happens, that firm's CEO is
also an outside director on "his" board. 165 Also, directors
naturally feel beholden to the person responsible for their
166
selection.
If the selection process errs and chooses someone unwilling
to knuckle under, the board will probably not be much affected.
First, the candidate may well decline the offer; to be a constant
board dissenter is not most people's idea of a good time. If the
offer is accepted, an atmosphere of "groupthink," in which
members of a group "adopt[] the goals and methods of the group
uncritically," pervades most boards and makes it awkward to
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How
"Both

theoretical and empirical reasons exist to believe that boards of a substantial minority,
and perhaps a substantial majority, of U.S. public corporations are dominated by
managers."); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 136 (2006) (stating that
board passivity "has continued at many U.S. companies").
162. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 67, at 193 (noting that, in 1991, 82% of vacancies
were filled on recommendation of the chairman, who is usually also the CEO); see also
Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy,
41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 34 (1993) (finding in a small survey of the 500 largest companies in
1989 that "the CEO initially recommended 90-100% of all directorial nominees"); Kevin
F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation, 32
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 331, 332 (1997) (stating that CEOs often choose new
directors); Benjamin E. Hermalin & MichaelS. Weisbach, Endogenousl:y Chosen Boards of
Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96-97 (1998) (stating
that CEOs choose or approve of board nominees).
163. CEOs of other companies comprise about 63% of outside directors. Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 (1991).
164. See id. ("These directors are unlikely to monitor more energetically than they
believe they should be monitored by their own boards.").
165. See Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover:
The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 952 (2003)
(asserting that "mutually interlocking directorships ... are prevalent"); Anil Shivdasani
& David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An
Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1852 (1999). Interlocking boards are associated with
higher CEO compensation. Fich & White, supra at 947-48.
166. "As long as a director is brought in by the CEO, he will naturally feel that it is
to the CEO that he owes his loyalty." MONKS & MIN OW, supra note 67, at 497.
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step out of line. 167 It's easier to resign. A stubborn gadfly may not
be renominated. 168
Repeated regulatory efforts to increase board independence
have proved futile or even counterproductive. By rules of the
SEC, NYSE, and NASDAQ, most large public companies now
have a majority of "independent" directors on the full board and
on several oversight committees, 169 but these changes have not
170
improved board performance.
One reason is
that
"independence" is, and probably must be, defined as a lack of
certain affiliations with the company and its managers. 171
However, many outside directors still have "soft" conflicts of
interest that are not caught by these definitions of independence.

167. Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 124 (2006); see also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger,
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83-84, 99-108 (1985) (describing bases of
ingroup bias among directors); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board:
Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 lVIrCH. L. REV. 1, 37-43 (1981); Jones, supra
note 161, at 139-41 (discussing board conformity). Put another way, "the very things that
make people likely to join a board-connections, business experience, sociability-are also
the things that make them less effective once they do." James Surowiecki, The Sky-High
Club, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22, 2007, at 32.
168. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 163, at 874-75.
169. See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers, Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251,
282-88 (2006) (describing the NYSE requirements); George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate
Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP. L. 39, 48 (2005) (listing the relevant
rules).
170. Several studies have found no correlation between corporate performance and
board "independence" as defined by regulations. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black,
The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27
J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House:
Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
33, 51-58 (2007); Gordon, supra note 67, at 34-43 (discussing the empirical literature);
David F. Larcker et al., How Important Is Corporate Governance? 20-33 (2005)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=595821 (finding little
correlation between firm performance and several common measures of corporate
governance quality). Some studies find a positive impact from increased board
independence. See, e.g., Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, Board of Directors
Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications, 17 ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 65, 75 (1993). Some studies find a negative impact from increased
board independence. See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and
Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 377, 394 (1996); Allen Kaufman et al., The Managerial Power
Thesis Revised: CEO Compensation and the Independence of Independent CEO Directors
6 EMP. BENEFITS COMPENSATION & PENSION L.J. (2005), http://ssm.com/abstract=678381
(finding that after some point a greater number of outside directors is associated with
worse firm performance); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure,
41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 300-01 (1998) (finding negative correlation between firn1
performance and absence of insiders on a board's finance and investment committees).
171. Bhagat & Black, supra note 170, at 266 (discussing the failure of purportedly
independent directors to fall within the "customary definition of independence").
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These conflicts correlate with board performance. 172 If, against all
odds, a rebel faction forms, it faces huge obstacles. 173 Most boards
meet about once a month, too little time to match the managers'
174
knowledge about the firm.
Directors also lack independent
sources of information; they know only what they are told by the
managers, the very people they are supposed to oversee.
Conflicts of interest are intrinsic to all boards. Directors
set their own compensation, and the CEO influences the board,
so each has a motive to be generous to the other .175 CEOs can
increase conflicts, in effect buying a director's loyalty, by
arranging company gifts to a charity with which the director is
connected, with consulting and other business ties, and
through personal and social contacts. 176 When Michael Ovitz
asked CEO Michael Eisner whether Disney's board would
approve the lavish contract Eisner proposed for Ovitz, "Eisner
laughed, ticking off the various ways that board members were
beholden to him, and assuring Ovitz that they would do what
he wanted." 177 Obsession with board "independence" even may
be counterproductive. A veneer of board independence gives
CEOs cover to feather their nests even more aggressively. This
may help explain why CEO compensation has exploded in
recent years while board independence supposedly increased. 178
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See David F. Larcker et al., Back Door Links Between Directors and Executive
Compensation 27 (2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=671063 (finding that even remote links between the CEO and outside directors
are associated with higher CEO compensation). Such conflicts seem also to have been
common at firms subject to recent scandals. See SKEEL, supra note 99, at 164-65
(referencing conflicts on Enron's board). See generally Fich & White, supra note 165
(discussing the implications of "mutual interlock" relationships within boards).
173. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 141-48 (1976)
(discussing the various obstacles faced by outside boards).
174. See id. at 141-43. One study reported that outside directors devoted, on
average, only 122 hours per year to their positions. Victor Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 609 n.38 (1982)
(citing KoRN/FERRY lNT'L, BOARD OF DIRECTORS: EIGHTH ANNuAL STUDY 20 (1981)).
175. Although their compensation is a small part of the earnings of most directors,
the amounts are not trivial. Five years ago, compensation at Fortune 200 companies was
reported to average $152,000 per year. Gary Strauss, Companies Pony Up to Keep
Directors; Board Seats Have Become Hot Seats, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 21, 2002, at Bl. The
figure is undoubtedly higher now, and it does not include fringe benefits like life and
medical insurance.
176. See Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits, supra note 105, at 79--80 (describing a
corporate gift to a museum for which one of the company's outside directors served as
president and a trustee); Paredes, supra note 100, at 510-11 (discussing the financial,
social, and personal pressures directors face in their relationships with company officers).
177. James B. Stewart, Partners: Eisner, Ovitz, and the Disney Wars, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 10, 2005, at 46.
178. Some studies find that a larger number of outside directors correlates to higher
executive compensation. See John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[44:5

200

In sum, corporate governance today features not director
primacy but director servility. Boards routinely approve
classified (staggered) boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, and
supermajority voting requirements, despite their notorious
179
destruction of firm value. Some directors acknowledge their
180
passivity. Peter Drucker, long the premier expert of business
181
management, disparaged outside directors as figureheads.
Even more telling is the treatment of the business press.
Discussions of corporate strategy and performance typically focus
on the CEO; outside directors are routinely ignored. Higher
standards of independence will not change this: "no definition of
independence will ever assure that an independent director will
182
indeed act as such."
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B. The Costs of CEO Domination
CEO-dominated boards impose great costs on investors. The
notorious excesses of executive compensation183 belie the
DPM/TPM. Compensation committees comprised entirely of
"independent" directors retain expert consultants to recommend
a compensation package, but the consultants themselves are far
from disinterested; they are compromised by numerous
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 388 (1999); Richard M. Cyert
eta!., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-N[anagement Compensation: Theory and
Evidence, 48 MGMT. Scr. 453, 466 (2002); see also infra notes 183-94 and accompanying
text (describing the growth and current excesses of executive compensation).
179. See Frakes, supra note 62, at 150-51; Lucian Bebchuk eta!., What Matters in
Corporate Governance 16-22 (John lVL Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch.,
Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-id=593423
(study showing that these features lower share value).
180. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate
Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 15 (2003)
(discussing a 2002 study by Kom!Ferry International finding that most directors wanted
their boards to be more assertive).
181.
PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 92 (rev. ed. 1972); see also
Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and
Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 263-69
(2005) (reviewing literature on CEO power).
182.
Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on PostEnron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAI<E FOREST L. REV. 911, 927 (2003).
183.
The literature is immense and grows daily. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 1 (2004) [hereinafter BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE];
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30
J. CORP. L. 647, 648-49 (2005) (responding to criticisms of BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra); John C. Bogle, The Executive Compensation System Is
Broken, 30 J. CORP. L. 761, 763 (2005). The escalation of executive compensation is
disproportionally concentrated in CEOs. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et a!., Pay Distribution
in the Top Executive Team (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch.,
Discussion Paper No. 574, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954609.
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184

incentives to inflate executive pay. Executive perquisites, like
luxurious offices and recreational facilities, large support staffs,
and private jets, are more lavish in public companies than in
185
comparable private firms and can be quite costly. 186 Self-dealing
187
is also common.
Even more troubling than the gross amounts of executive
pay are the many glaring design flaws. Often companies do not
188
tie compensation to performance. Plans that are performancebased are rarely indexed, so executives reap windfalls if their
industry, or the market generally, just hits good times. 189
Executives can also circumvent performance conditions by
"exercising options, selling shares, or using derivatives to hedge
their positions."190 One study found a negative correlation
between executive compensation and performance in firms with
191
no large shareholders. Over 2,000 companies issued backdated
options so that executives could profit even if the company's stock
price languished. 192 This activity is especially offensive because
its costs to shareholders far exceed its benefits to the favored
executives. 193 In both size and design, executive pay schemes
184.
See Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate America's Pay Pal, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 15,
2006, § 3, at 1 (chronicling how one consulting firm repeatedly boosted executive
compensation for over 1,800 clients); Gretchen Morgenson, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay
May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1 (discussing the "long and
lucrative relationship" between one executive-compensation consulting firm and its
client); see also Cox, supra note 98, at 106 ("The role of the compensation consultant is
fraught with conflicting interests .... "); Fogel & Geier, supra note 170, at 63-64
("[M]anagers use the compensation consultants as 'camouflage' to extract premium rents
from the compensation committee.").
185.
See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORI'vlANCE 65-66,
80, 86-87 (1975) (reviewing empirical studies).
186.
See David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and
Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 213 (2006) (showing that personal
CEO use of company planes is associated with average shareholder returns that
"underperform market benchmarks by more than 4% ... per year").
187.
See Elizabeth A Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with
Corporate Governance and Firm Value 4-5 (EFA Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377,
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=558983.
188.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 183, at 121.
The percentage of profits going to top executives nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003.
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. EcoN.
POL'Y 283, 287 (2005).
189.
Hohnstrom & Kaplan, supra note 180, at 13.
190.
Id.
191.
See Robert Daines et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill
17 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-035, 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=622223.
192.
See Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options Widespread, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1.
193. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive
Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (2007) (finding that the average loss per
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stink of control by management-not by independent directors
bent on optimizing firm performance. Thus, Warren Buffett has
called compensation committees "tail-wagging puppy dogs." 194
Compensation plans also distort disclosure. Managers doctor
share prices by withholding or falsifying information, then trade
in the company's stock at prices they know are wrong. In "pump
and dump" schemes managers inflate the firm's stock price by
releasing false good news and suppressing bad news. They then
sell their own stock at inflated prices, often after exercising stock
options that had no value until the market was fixed. 195 Directors
responsive to shareholders would police such misconduct, but
most CEO-dominated boards don't even try. In the many recent
scandals involving fraudulent disclosures, boards made little
effort to detect or deter the fraud or to discipline guilty officers
who were caught by others. 196
Even if they don't break the law, CEOs often enrich
themselves by their choices within the broad discretion offered by
generally accepted accounting principles. Executive pay is often
tied to reported earnings, and many managers choose accounting
methods that increase reported earnings instead of the
shareholders' preferred goal of maximizing share price. 197
Although some claim the TPM benefits employees, wage
disparities between CEOs and average workers have soared in
recent years. These extreme disparities "result in greater

persc
quali

1246

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

firm to shareholders was around $380 million but the potential gain to all the executives
benefited in each firm averaged under $500,000).
194.
See Surowiecki, supra note 167, at 32.
195. See generally ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L. INDERGAARD, PuMP AND DUMP:
THE RANCID RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY (2005); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate
Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other
Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 703-04 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate
Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 6-8 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working
Paper No. 274, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=694581 (noting that an
industry-wide shift to equity-based compensation created incentives for market and
accounting manipulation). Managers also time corporate disclosures to maximize their
profits on stock options. See David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and
the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73, 74 (2000); Keith
Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option
Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 59 (2001); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option
Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 802 (2005); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option
Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449, 449-50 (1997).
196. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson & Ben White, Opportunity for Corporate Fraud Has
Shrunk-But It's Still There, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 26, 2006, at Dl (recalling the wake
of Enron and noting how "[b]oards of directors ... turned a blind eye to overly aggressive
business practices").
197.
David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior 14-15 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-05, 2006),
available at http:l/ssm.com/abstract=894002.
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personnel turnover, lower employee morale, poorer product
quality, and lower productivity." 198
Some CEOs use their power to pursue growth, or "empire
building." They reinvest retained earnings even if they have no
199
promising investment opportunities. They are often rewarded
for increasing firm size independent of profits. 200 As a result,
returns on reinvested profits tend to be low. 201 Unprofitable
acquisitions are common. 202 Other CEOs do the opposite-leading
203
the "quiet life" through underinvestment. This does not mean
that they maximize dividends, however. They may finance with
retained earnings rather than incurring debt or even use profits
to reduce debt, despite the lower cost and tax advantages of debt.
In so doing, they avoid the discipline debt imposes on
managers. 204
The discretion managers enjoy from the separation of
ownership and control itself introduces uncertainties that impede
market efficiency. Skillful managers may earn high profits, but
investors cannot be sure when or how much of those profits will

198.
Cox, supra note 98, at 114.
199.
This misuse of earnings lowers dividend payouts. See D. Denis, Twenty-Five
Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting, 10 REV. FIN. ECON. 191, 195
(2001) (noting managers' preference to "hold on to cash flow and/or invest it in negative
NPV projects rather than return it to shareholders"); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1148-49 (2002).
200.
See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 188, at 287 (asserting that 60% of average
CEO compensation increases over a ten year period were not explained by changes in firm
size and performance).
201.
William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REV.
ECON. & STATISTICS 128, 130 (1973); see also William J. Baumol et al., Earnings
Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 345, 354
(1970) (showing that firms that issued little equity had returns on reinvestment of
retained earnings that approached zero).
202.
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 614 (stating that "studies of acquiring
company stock performance report results ranging from no statistically significant stock
price effect to statistically significant losses"); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 300-02 (2d ed. 1995). Further,
"[a]cquiring firms appear to suffer negative abnormal returns in the several years
following the transaction." Id. at 309. The highest prices tend to be paid by publicly
traded acquirers whose managers own the least amount of their companies' stock. Leonce
Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers?,
20-23 (Fisher Coil. of Bus., Ohio St. Univ., Working Paper No. 2007-03-011, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980066.
203.
See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting 0yvind B~hren); see also Kose
John et al., Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking 1 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979413 ("When ... private benefits are
large, insiders may undertake sub-optimally conservative investment decisions to
preserve them. Better investor protection reduces these private benefits and may
therefore induce riskier but value enhancing investment policy.").
204.
See Jensen, supra note 142, at 321-23 (discussing how debt disciplines
managers).
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20

205

be paid to them rather than appropriated by the managers. If
managers are incompetent or greedy, investors cannot know how
soon those managers will retire or die and whom they will choose
to succeed them.
Boards strive to entrench themselves and the CEO. Many
firms have staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, and
supermajority voting requirements. Boards loyal to shareholders
could use these devices to prevent a raider from exploiting the
shareholders' disorganization to grab the company at a
suboptimal price. In practice, though, these devices are used to
block attractive takeover bids, as evidenced by the damage that
206
adoption of these devices does to share value. When a firm
thwarts a bid and stays independent, its stock price typically
falls to pre-offer levels; stockholders simply lose the chance for a
207
big premium.
Because those who control a company can abuse their power
to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders, corporate
law developed derivative suits as a means for courts to scrutinize
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. 208 However, the law also
requires that, before filing a derivative suit, a shareholder must
make a demand on the board to correct the alleged breach, unless
demand is futile because wrongdoers dominate the board. 209 This
requirement supposedly allows the board to protect the
210
corporation from wastefullitigation.
To see how absurd this rule is, imagine the reaction if the
defendant in any other type of litigation proposed to have a group
of her business associates, chosen by her, decide whether the
plaintiffs suit against her should be allowed to proceed. The
problems inherent in this approach are obvious. I do not know of
205.
See Jensen, supra note 19, at 10 (arguing that waste of free cash flow helps
explains the apparent under-pricing of some public companies); see also Lucian A
Bebchuk et al., CEO Centrality (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper No. 601, Nov.
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1030107 (asserting that greater CEO
dominance is associated with, inter alia, lower firm value, profitability, and stock
retums).
206.
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 179, at 2-3 (showing that a six-factor
entrenchment index is associated with significantly lower firm value). The presence of
antitakeover devices is associated with higher CEO compensation. BEBCHUK & FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 183, at 84.
207.
See Michael Bradley et al., The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers:
Information Or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983); Richard S. Ruback, Do Target
Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests?, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 137, 137 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
208.
See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639-40 (1986).
209.
See id. at 640-49.
210.
See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1681 (2002).
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a single case where a board reacted to a shareholder demand by
saying, "Gosh! We had no idea of this misconduct. Thanks for
telling us," and then promptly rectified the wrong.
This account of boards' kowtowing to CEOs is severely
abridged. It could be much longer, but the facts have been
elaborated by others, and the point, I hope, has been made:
Contrary to the claims of the TPM/DPM, boards of most public
companies are not independent mediators of conflicting interests
among shareholders, or between shareholders and stakeholders.
Most boards are dominated by their CEO and serve his interests,
at great cost to shareholders and with considerable loss of
efficiency, to the detriment of society in general.
What is needed is "an external corrective mechanism." 211 The
most effective corrective is shareholder power. "Firms with
strong shareholder rights and high institutional ownership are
found to earn abnormal retums and have higher accounting
212
profitability." Executive compensation is more reasonable in
companies with strong shareholder rights 213 and correlates more
closely with firm performance in companies with one or more
shareholders large enough to exert some influence. 214 These facts
also refute claims that executive compensation in companies with
CEO-dominated boards is reasonable and efficient. If the lower
compensation more closely attuned to performance in companies
with strong shareholders was inadequate, their performance
should be worse. In fact, it is superior.
IV. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Champions of the DPMtrPM claim that market forces have
brought corporate governance to Nirvana, to maximum
efficiency. This claim is laughable. Markets operate within the
law; misguided laws impair market efficiency. Further, markets
211. Jones, supra note 161, at 139.
212. Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the
Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 6 (Feb. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264; see also Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven,
The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance
Working Paper No. 165/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965733 (finding
that "governance provisions adopted beyond those imposed by the 'norms' in the country
have a strong, positive effect on firm valuation").
213. Pornsit Jiraporn et al., CEO Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Corporate
Governance: An Empirical Investigation, 29 J. ECON. & FIN. 242, 243 (2005).
214.
See Daines et al., supra note 191, at 17; see also Michael C. Jensen et al.,
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How
to Fix Them 75-76 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Negotiations, Orgs., & Markets Research Paper,
Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (arguing
that corporations should externalize performance-based standards).
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are not frictionless. Inter alia, transaction costs and information
asymmetries affect markets. Markets also take time; they do not
work instantaneously. Corporate governance has not reached
215
perfection; it is still evolving.
However, market forces are
altering corporate govemance in ways that erode the DPM/TPM
and foster shareholder primacy.
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Legal Obstacles to Shareholder Primacy. One obstacle to
shareholder power is that poor managers can be ousted only by a
proxy fight or when someone new purchases control of the
company. Both options are difficult and expensive. In proxy
fights, incumbents enjoy huge advantages; the firm pays their
expenses, but insurgents must bear their own costs. 216 Collective
action problems and other obstacles hinder shareholders from
waging effective proxy insurgencies. 217 The problems would be
smaller if a few institutions owned large blocks of a company's
stock, but there are economic limits on such holdings. 218 The law
1.

215.
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have argued that. the "standard
shareholder-oriented model" of corporate governance was "the most attractive social ideal
for the organization of large-scale enterprise," as well as "the most efficient way to
organize large-scale industry," and that "practice and law are, as a matter of fact,
converging on" this model. Henry Hansmarrn, How Close Is the End of History?, 31 J.
CORP. L. 745, 746--48 (2006) (discussing Henry Hansmarrn & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001)). They did not predict that this
would happen promptly; they "carefully avoided offering any timeframe for future
convergence." Id. at 748. The rise of the "shareholder-oriented model," or shareholder
primacy, could encounter "interruptions." Id. at 749. However, "convergence in fact has
proceeded quite quickly" in recent years. Id. at 748; see also Gianni de Nicolo et a!.,
Corporate Governance Quality: Trends and Real Effects 5 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 06/293, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956757; Mathias M. Siems,
Shareholder Protection Around the World 1 (June 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991092 (finding that "in general there has been a
convergence in the last decade" in international standards of shareholder protection).
Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in
216.
American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 317, 337 (1998) (explaining why proxy
fights are rarely successful).
217.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 688-94 (2007) (discussing impediments to electoral challenges); Black, supra note 5,
at 536 (discussing the burdens the proxy rules place on shareholders); see also infra notes
234-37 and accompanying text (discussing shareholders' collective action problems).
Management also has superior access to information about voting outcomes and can
engage in vote buying and selective vote counting so that it almost "always wins the close
ones." Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones 4 (John M. Olin Center for
Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 348), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980695.
218.
[An investor] may often be impeded by limitations on her capital; limitations on
her borrowing ability; regulatory and practical limits on some kinds of trading
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also discourages large accumulations. 219 And there are "social
constraints and fear: fear that a successful effort at control [by
financial institutions) will trigger a political reaction." 220 AB a
result, serious proxy fights are rare, especially in larger public
companies. 221 Through a friendly acquisition a buyer can
eliminate the agency costs of director primacy, but incumbent
managers can and do demand personal benefits (in effect, bribes)
222
in return for approving the deal.
Hostile takeovers avoid this problem. They benefit
shareholders and the whole economy by removmg poor
managements. 223 Hostile acquisitions are hindered, though, by
high transaction costs and, more important, by antitakeover
devices like poison pills and staggered boards. 224 If a hostile
takeover is possible at all, the raider usually must offer target
shareholders a premium of at least thirty-five percent over its
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(for example, short selling); the necessity of bearing risk; and a need to meet
short-term goals and metrics that makes it impossible to exploit mispricing that
cannot be counted upon to disappear very quickly.
Stout, supra note 63, at 1441.
219. Large shareholders are subject to special disclosure rules. Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000). They are also subject to insider trading and short-swing
profit rules. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14e-3, & 240.16a-1 to 240.16b-8 (2007); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y
671, 712-13 (1995). Large shareholders who work together could also trigger a company's
poison pill. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 202, at 1434-35.
220.
Roe, supra note 118, at 30; see also id. at 31-53 (discussing the history of
hostility to large shareholder influence in America).
221.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the
Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 559 (2005).
222.
See GEVURTZ, supra note 7, § 4.2.6, at 360 (stating that side payments to
insiders are permitted if ostensibly given for valid consideration and not as a bribe).
223.
See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 112 (citing study showing that "target companies
had underperformed their peers by 45 percent in return on equity, by 73 percent in
growth rate, and by 25 percent in market-to-book value"). Critics of this claim note that
acquirers do not seek out poorly managed companies; many prefer well managed
companies. LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN
AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 134-35 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the
Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.ll45, 1211-12 (1984) (citing surveys ofbidders).
The latter claim is partly true, but does not contradict the former. Acquirers seek firms
whose stock price is far below intrinsic value. This can happen when a company is
operationally efficient but wastes cash flow or seems likely to do so in the future. See
Jensen, supra note 19, at 13-14.
224.
See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 62, at 430 (reporting study finding that
staggered boards are associated with significantly reduced firm value); Lucian Bebchuk,
Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. FA. L: REv. 713, 714 (2003);
Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J.
FIN. 1495, 1515 (1997) (showing that takeover defenses are associated with higher agency
costs and poor performance); Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate Governance and
Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1854 (2007) (showing negative correlation between the
strength of a firm's antitakeover provisions and profitability of its acquisitions).
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pre-offer stock price. 225 Thus incumbents can waste at least
twenty-five percent of profits before they risk a hostile raid. As a
result, hostile tender offers are almost as rare as serious proxy
fights. 226 Some protest that boards generally reject only
inadequate takeover bids. 227 The evidence is to the contrary:
''When incumbents defeat offers, shareholders experience on
average a significant decline in stock value ... :ma
Rarely can shareholders use litigation to call directors to
account. Courts will not intervene unless the board's conduct is
so bad that it evinces "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregard for one's responsibilities."229 Stricter scrutiny applies
when directors are self-interested, but this scrutiny can be
evaded by delegating a decision to fellow directors with no
personal stake in the matter, even though those directors have
ties to the interested directors that would clearly disqualify them
in other situations, such as judge and litigant. 230 Actions with no
direct financial dealing between the firm and directors, but that
cement the incumbents' control, are reviewed less rigorously. 231
Finally, most suits to hold directors accountable must be brought
as derivative suits, which face many procedural obstacles,
especially a requirement to show that the board is dominated by
persons directly monetarily threatened by the suit. 232 As a result,
only crude or clumsy looting can be challenged by shareholder
suits.
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See Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 934-36 (giving data on takeover
premiums).
226.
See id. at 925 (study showing that, from January 1996 to December 2000, only
ninety-two of 2421 (3.8%) large public companies received an unfriendly takeover bid). In
only twenty-three of these bids was the target ultimately acquired by the initial bidder.
Id. at 933.
227.
See Stout, supra riote 63, at 1439.
228.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 973, 1004 (2002); see also supra note 206 and accompanying text.
229.
In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). Some argue that this leeway
is necessary so that managers can sacrifice profits in the interests of shareholders. See
Elhauge, supra note 47, at 770-71. Where sacrificing short term profits enhances share
value, it should be supported by shareholders at least as much as by managers.
230.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (2001) (allowing interested transactions if
approved by a majority of disinterested directors); Brown, supra note 105, at 55-56, 77, 83
(criticizing Delaware courts' disregard of connections between interested and "noninterested" directors); id. at 70 (stating that this approach ''has been labeled by some as
an abject failure").
231.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)
(applying a standard somewhere between the business judgment test and the strict
scrutiny standard to takeover defenses).
232.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-16 (Del. 1984) (requiring
particularized fact allegations of corporate direction of improper conduct), overruled on
other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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2. The Shareholders' Collective Action Problem and
Management Pressure. Shareholders suffer from a collective
action problem. A shareholder who wins a proxy fight and raises
the firm's equity value gets only a pro rata part of the increase
but cannot compel other shareholders to share the proxy costs;
they can "free ride" on the effort of the insurgent. 233 An
institutional investor who bore all these costs would suffer a cost
disadvantage vis-a-vis competing institutions; 234 thus, passivity
pays. 235 Many institutional investors are also vulnerable to
management pressure when they vote. 236 Nonetheless,
antitakeover devices so damage shareholders' interests that
opposition to them is now widespread and often succeeds. 237
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3. Problems of Information. The widely accepted "semistrong" version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis
posits that capital markets quickly impound all public
information. 238 However, corporate managers can and often do
distort share prices by deceptive publicity. 239 Such deception
violates the federal securities laws 240 but is difficult to detect
and prove.
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233.
Black, supra note 5, at 527-28.
234.
Because of competition, most institutional investors are cost-conscious. See
Rock, supra note 116, at 460-63, 473-74.
235.
See ROBERT A. G. MONKS & A. SYKES, CAPITALISM WITHOUT OWNERS WILL FAIL:
A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO REFORM 14 (2002) (''Passive institutions gain 95% or more of
the benefit from any successful shareholder action at no cost-and with a real chance of
winning business away from the more activist group."); Shann Turnbull, Invigorating
Capitalism 4 (Sixth Int'l Conference on Corporate Governance & Ed. Leadership Paper,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=437981 (indicating that cost-benefit analysis,
free-riders, and uncertain outcomes prompt "institutional shareholders to be 'reluctant,'
apathetic or negligent in exercising their ownership rights"). This situation may be
changing. See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text (describing growing shareholder
activism and its effects).
236.
See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 52 (stating that CEOs pressure pension fund
managers to vote with management); Dent, supra note 169, at 55 n.98·. For a good case
study, see Gretchen Morgenson, Investors us. Pfizer: Guess Who Has the Guns?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 32, 2006, § 3, at 1.
237.
See Michael D. Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and
Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757-62 (2003) (giving
figures on shareholder opposition to various antitakeover devices); Randall S. Thomas &
James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support,
Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 369, 377-78 (2007)
(documenting growing support for shareholder proposals, especially those opposing
anti takeover devices).
238.
See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 12, at 351.
239.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
240.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (forbidding manipulation and deception in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities).
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Even if public information is accurate, investors have
limited capacity to process it. Investors act with bounded
rationality; that is, they expend resources to analyze
information only to the point at which it seems that the profits
241
from analysis exceed the costs. As one result, the choice of
corporate governance rules is
influenced by "network externalities." It is advantageous for
a company to offer an arrangement that is familiar to
institutional investors, that facilitates pricing relative to
other companies, that is backed by a developed body of
precedents and judges familiar with the arrangement.
Conversely, companies are discouraged from adopting
arrangements that are unconventional and radically
different from those in other companies. 242
Even a large institutional investor trading the securities of,
or casting proxy votes for, a large issuer generally does not find it
worthwhile to conduct extensive research into the quality of the
issuer's corporate governance system or to speculate about the
value of novel charter terms. 243 As a result, charters of public
companies are remarkably uniform. 244
Until recently, most institutions relied on rating and
advisory services to evaluate corporate govemance, 245 and these
services generally used a single template rather than judging the
unique circumstances of each issuer. 246 Even an investor who
knew that antitakeover devices harm firm value also knew that
247
the market did not factor such devices into stock prices. The
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241.
See Choi, supra note 167, at 112-13. See generally David M. Kreps, Bounded
Rationality, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 168, 172
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("[H]igh levels of analysis will not be undertaken for small
stakes .... ").
242.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 890 (2005) (footnote omitted).
See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do !PO Charters Maximize Firm
243.
Value?: Antitakeouer Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 113 (2001) ("Perhaps
govemance terms are expensive for investors to price at the time of the IPO. This would
allow management to get protection at low (or no) cost.").
244.
See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 784-91 (2006).
245.
See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889-90,
897 (2007) (describing extensive use of advisory services by institutional investors); id. at
907-16 (describing "one-size-fits-all" approach and extensive use of "rules of thumb" by
advisory services).
See id. at 908.
246.
247.
In effect, this is a networking problem. See Mark A Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998) (noting
that network externalities arise "where purchasers find a good more valuable as
additional purchasers buy the same good").
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investor could profit from its insight only by buying stock of firms
without antitakeover provisions and holding them until they
were acquired. Few investors can wait that long. Rating and
advisory services are growing more sophisticated in analyzing
corporate governance, though, with the result that institutional
investors are becoming more assertive about governance issues. 248
The information problems of investors are exacerbated by
conflicts of interest among financial advisors. In several recent
cases, analysts defrauded their own clients by advising them to
buy a stock that the analyst himself was selling. 249 Many
analysts' employers coerce them to recommend companies with
which the employer does business. 250 Employers also pressure
advisors to generate commissions by encouraging clients to trade
more than they should. Accordingly, even though markets are not
perfectly efficient, many investors decide it is not worth the costs
and risks to try to beat the market; they prefer to index. 251
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4. Markets Take Time. The investor's difficulty is escalated
by the fact that the correction of a stock mispricing may take a
long time. The longer the correction takes, the greater the
deviation must be to promise an adequate rate of return. A long
wait also exacerbates investors' doubts about whether an
analyst's claim of mispricing is true. Even if the analyst is right,
clients may lose faith and bail out before the correction occurs.
This problem plagues mutual funds. A fund that
underperforms for several quarters can proclaim that its strategy
is sound and just needs time to bear fruit, but it is hard for
investors to validate such claims. Many will move their money
elsewhere. Because funds realize economies of scale, funds
suffering large redemptions are at a disadvantage to competitors
even if they have a superior investment strategy. 252 Thus it is
safer for a fund not to bank on long-term profits.
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See infra notes 314-21 and accompanying text.
See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the
Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 57, 58, 60-64 (2006) (cataloging analyst
248.
249.

conflicts of interest that lead to biased reports and recommendations).
250.
See Lily Fang & Ayako Yasuda, Analyst Reputation, Underwriting Pressure and
Forecast Accuracy 4, 24 (The Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., Working Paper No. 24-04, 2005),
available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-rlwctr/papers/0507.pdf ("Conflict of
interest is expected to be more severe in top-tier banks because these banks have a strong
tradition to reward analysts for the generation of underwriting business.").
251.
See JOHN C. BOGLE, JOHN BOGLE ON INvESTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS 41-42
(2000) (describing the theory and practice of indexing).
See Rock, supra note 116, at 480 (debating why pension fund managers pursue
252.
strong governance matters with greater zeal than private mutual fund managers).
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Superior returns should then be available to investors who
will absorb the high cost of finding mispriced stocks and make
large enough investments to cover these costs, then wait as long
as necessary for prices to be corrected. In theory, that is the role
of arbitrageurs, but their activity is hampered by limited capital
and borrowing capacity and by legal restraints on some kinds of
trading (like short selling). As a result, most are unwilling or
unable to make large, long-term investments in supposedly
mispriced issues. 253
In sum, there are many impediments, both legal and
economic, that hinder the creation of optimal corporate
governance arrangements. 254

co
re

B. Initial Public Offerings

Some defenders of the DPM/TPM acknowledge problems
with the EMCGH for firms that are already public, so they
focus instead on IPOs. They argue that companies going public
offer the most attractive corporate governance rules in order to
fetch the highest possible price for their stock in the IP0. 255
However, empirical studies cast grave doubt on whether
antitakeover provisions (ATPs), for example, benefit public
shareholders. 256 Of course,
selling shareholders may
253.
For discussions of the limits of arbitrage, see generally Gordon Gemmil & Dylan
C. Thomas, Noise Trading, Costly Arbitrage, and Asset Prices: Evidence from Closed End
Funds, 57 J. FIN. 2571, 2590 (2002); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishney, The Limits of
Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35-37 (1997); Jeremy C. Stein, Why Are Most Funds Open-End?
Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage, 119 Q.J. ECON. 247, 247-48 (2005), Daniel A.
Cohen et al., Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to Arbitrage 27-31 (2004)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642045.
254.
See Klausner, supra note 244, at 797 ("[T]ransaction costs that stem from
learning and network externalities, and perhaps other market imperfections, impede
[legally binding corporate governance agreements] and instead drive firms en masse
towards incorporating in Delaware and adopting charters comprised of a limited and
familiar set of highly standardized terms.").
255.
See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1737; Gordon, supra note 114, at 358 (positing
that "entrepreneurs selling stock to the public would bear the cost" of suboptimal
corporate governance provisions); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate
Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 502 (2003) ("[W]e continue to believe that the IPO charter terms provide substantial
evidence of appropriate governance structures."); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses
Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post I Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV.
845, 853-56 (2002) ("Shareholders act as if they value corporate governance rules that
insulate boards from hostile takeovers.").
256.
See Daines & Klausner, supra note 243, at 97-106; Julian Atanassov, Quiet Life
or Managerial Myopia: Is the Threat of Hostile Takeovers Beneficial for Technological
Innovation (EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper Aug. 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=967421 (concluding that executives talce advantage of
anti takeover laws to lead a "quiet life" rather than to overcome the detriments of investor
myopia).
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consciously accept a lower offering price in exchange for
retaining the perquisites of control; that is legitimate.
However, there are always minority shareholders who must
also live with the lower stock price but do not share in control.
Further, there may be benefits to controlling shareholders in
. exch ange. 257
th IS
Venture capital firms may also accept a suboptimal IPO
price in exchange for retaining a voice in control. A low offering
price reduces returns to the fund managed by the venture capital
firm and thus largely reduces benefits to the limited partners
who are the fund's passive investors. 258 The partners in the
venture capital firm, however, hold board seats from which they
personally benefit through both direct compensation and access
259
to inside information. By acceding to managers in an IPO,
venture capitalists also preserve a reputation for cooperating
with entrepreneurs, a reputation that benefits other funds the
firm manages. 260
Further, the IPO market may not be efficient. IPOs depend
heavily on underwriters' marketing to irrational "sentiment" or
261
"noise" investors
who may be vulnerable to the inflated
earnings reports common to IPO firms. 262 Many IPO underwriters

{e

lg
11£

,al
of
or
lly

o.d
Lte

ns
ey
he
to
255

rlan
i£nd
s of
.'nd?
1 A.
)04)

'rom
Jede
asse
and
ting
imal

'rate
REV.

1tial
nses
REV.

that

Life
?ical
at
of
~star

257.
See Bebchuk, supra note 224, at 716 (noting that those who "will continue to run
the finn after the IPO ... will fully capture the benefits of [ATPs] and will bear only part
of the cost of reduced IPO share price"). In about one-third of IPOs from 1996 to 2000,
executives received stock options at an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price. See
Michelle Lowry & Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Stock Options and IPO Underpricing, 85 J .
FIN. EcoN. 39,40 (2007). In one study over half these executives realized a net profit from
underpricing of the IPO. Id. at 43-45. There are also tax benefits to ATPs. By retaining
control, insiders can extract tangible benefits (like luxurious offices and expense accounts)
and intangible benefits (like the prestige of autocracy) that are not taxed at all. Cf Daines
& Klausner, supra note 243, at 85 (hypothesizing that ATPs may be used at the IPO stage
to protect incumbents' large private benefits). In effect, the U.S. Treasury bears some of
the agency costs of the separation of ownership and control.
See Graeme Camp et al., Incentives to Underprice, 46 ACCT. & FIN. 537, 539
258.
(2006) (stating that underpricing of an offering may "generate compensatory benefits in
the aftermarket"); see also JOSEPH SHADE, BUSINESS AsSOCIATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 33-35
(2d ed. 2006) (describing, inter alia, limited partnerships and their use in venture capital
firms).
See Douglas C=ing & Jeffrey Macintosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in
259.
Venture Capital Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 892-93 (2004) (discussing ways in
which venture capital firms may favor themselves over the funds they advise).
260.
See Klausner, supra note 237, at 770-71 ("[A]n important concern ... is
whether the fund's reputation for working well with management is at risk.").
261.
See Fran~;ois Derrien, IPO Pricing in "Hot" Market Conditions: Who Leaves
Money on the Table?, 60 J. FIN. 487, 497-98 (2005); Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot
Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing 31, 34-36 CAFA San Diego Meetings, Nov. 6
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfin?abstract_id=282293.
See Bolton et al., supra note 126, at 733 (discussing earnings manipulation by
262.
pre-IPO firms); Fran«;:ois DeGeorges & Richard Zeckhauser, The Reverse LBO Decision
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require customers to buy the stock in the aftermarket in return
for IPO allocations ("tie-in" agreements), a practice that distorts
prices in the aftermarket. 263 In effect, the managers of IPO firms,
their largest outside shareholders (often venture capital firms),
and the underwriters create complex distributions in which they
all profit at the expense of small investors. 264 As a result, IPOs
265
tend to be overpriced. ATPs and other corporate governance
features that benefit the managers at the expense of the
purchasers in the IPO may be part of the benefits the managers
realize from these market distortions.
Sales of IPOs are abetted by the underwriter's securities
analysts. They rate IPO issues underwritten by affiliated
investment bankers more favorably than do unaffiliated
analysts. 266 That practice may now end because investors have
caught on, or because of new laws and regulatory pressure
against such behavior, or both. 267 Even if the practice has
diminished, though, the ability of investment banks to indulge in
such behavior for many years illustrates the imperfection of the
IPO market.
It makes little sense for investors to try to price novel
corporate governance features for transactions as small as the

and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence, 48 J. FIN. 1323, 1324-30 (1993) (finding
frequent earnings manipulation by LBO firms prior to going public again). Asymmetric
risk may also motivate underwriters to set low prices in IPOs. See Atanu Saha & Allen
Ferrell, An Asymmetric Payoff-Based Explanation of IPO "Underpricing" 2, 12 (John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 587, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991917. However, setting low prices may offset the
disadvantages of the issuer's inefficient corporate governance to investors.
263. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Underwriter Manipulation in Initial Public
Offerings 7-9 (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=686252 (providing
examples of recent tie:in agreements).
264. See Gerard Hoberg & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Underwriters Collaborate with
Venture Capitalists in IPOs? Implications and Evidence 6-7 (Apr. 26, 2005) (unpublished
comment), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=690421 (describing arrangements).
265. See Olaf Ehrhardt & Henry Lahr, Private Benefits and the Decision to Go Public
9, 56-57 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=885721 (noting that some
"argue that investors are too optimistic [and t)herefore, IPOs are overpriced"); see also
Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 23, 28-29 (1995)
(showing abnormally low post-IPO stock price performance).
266. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of LongTerm Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings, CONTEMP. ACCT.
RES. 1, 17 (2000) ("[A)ffiliated analysts make the most overly optimistic forecasts."); Rani
Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflicts of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter
Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 653-55 (1999).
267. See Maureen F. McNichols et al., That Ship Has Sailed: Unaffiliated Analysts'
Recommendation Performance for IPO Firms 2-3 (March 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=892633 (describing legal and regulatory changes and reporting
no difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations between 1994
and 2001).
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268

typical investment in an IP0. Any effort by an underwriter or
issuer to inform buyers about the value of unique governance
features would be suspect as self-serving. Independent analysts
do not evaluate corporate governance. There are no recognized
independent experts who could be hired to certify the value of an
unusual governance feature. It would be difficult for a would-be
expert to establish a track record since the value of an attractive
corporate governance regime will typically not be realized for
many years.
The need to educate would not end with the IPO; to keep the
benefit of a governance feature in its stock price in the
aftermarket, the issuer would have to inform investors
continually about that feature. Further, the issuer is a one-time
player. It would bear all the costs of verifying the value of the
feature; later issuers could free-ride on this effort. The
underwriter is a repeat player and so might have an incentive to
provide credible certification of the value of a corporate
governance plan. To do so, however, would be awkward because
it would tacitly devalue the underwriter's other clients who lack
such a plan.
In most IPOs the issuer's officers and its venture capital
investors retain a majority of the shares after the offering. 269
Accordingly, they would not only have to persuade purchasers of
the value of their governance structure but also pledge not to
change it after the IPO. They could do this with a charter clause
requiring a supermajority shareholder vote to amend the
structure. 270 This would complicate and increase the cost of both
corporate planning and of the explanation effort. It would also
lock the firm into rules that might have unexpected
consequences. Moreover, the forms ATPs take are varied and
constantly evolving, so a commitment precluding just one set of
ATPs would be of little value. Finally, takeovers, even if
relatively unimpeded, are only a partial cure for the ills of
separation of ownership and control. Devices to commit to
268.
See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate''), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 733-36
(1997) (describing network externalities that encourage standardization in corporate
contracts). In particular, the value sacrificed by ATPs varies among companies, and it
would be costly to calculate separately the amount lost in each IPO. See Klausner, supra
note 237, at 776-77.
But see Daines, supra note 22, at 1560 (suggesting that "an IPO cuts managers'
269.
ownership by roughly 50%," and that this reduction therefore decrease the managers'
incentive to improve corporate governance).
270.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2001 & Supp. 2006) (permitting provision in
certificate of incorporation requiring supermajority board or shareholder vote for
stipulated matters).
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shareholder control may be on the horizon, but they do not exist
yet.
The recent growth of governance ratings agencies and proxy
advisors is making investors better informed about each issuer's
governance. 271 In time, this trend may change the governance of
IPO firms. Until recently, "institutional investors were
apparently unaware of the fact that companies were going public
with takeover defenses in their charters."272 This fact is now
getting more attention. As awareness dawns, investors are
registering dissatisfaction with it. 273 For now, however, the
governance of IPO firms is far from optimal.

C. The Market for State Law
The argument that states compete to offer the most investorfriendly corporate law is also fatally flawed. The "market" for
corporate law has major barriers to entry that keep other states
from challenging Delaware's dominance. 274 If another state
adopted a law appealing enough to attract many companies to
incorporate there, Delaware could just copy the attractive
275
features. It is also unclear what features are appealing in this
market. Since CEOs now dominate most public companies, any
competition among the states may just cater to CEOs. 276
Any constraint on Delaware corporate law from other
jurisdictions probably stems less from other states than from the

271. See infra notes 314-21 and accompanying text.
272.
Klausner, supra note 237, at 764; see also Bebchuk, supra note 224, at 740-42
(discussing the role of bounded rationality in IPO pricing).
See Klausner, supra note 237, at 765-68.
273.
274. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 563, 568-71
(2002); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Nlysterious Race to
the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 381, 382 (2005) (questioning whether there is a
race to either the top or the bottom). Delaware is chosen by 95% of firms that incorporate
outside their home state. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of !PO Firms, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1563 (2002).
275. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG.
139, 164 (2003).
276. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. lNST'L &
THEORETICAL ECON. 134 (2006) (finding that state competition produces optimal
governance rules only to the extent they preserve managers' private benefits). This
hypothesis is supported by evidence that incorporation in Delaware is not associated with
higher firm value, as one would expect if Delaware law were better for investors. Lucian
Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1775, 1788-90 (2002); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 41, 46 (2004) (finding no evidence of such a correlation in the 1990s
except for firms with small market value).
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threat of federal regulation. This threat may help to explain the
wild fluctuations in Delaware law. When the federal government
shows interest in increasing corporate governance regulation,
Delaware courts move to obviate it by tightening their standards.
When the heat abates, they revert to their usual laxity. When
federal action loomed in the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court
ratcheted up the duty of care-or seemed to do so-by holding
278
directors liable in Smith v. Van Gorkom, even though their
behavior was well within normal practices. Once the danger
passed, state courts forgot Van Gorkom; no director was careless
enough to be held liable. 279 When Enron and other scandals
provoked demands that directors be required to exercise at least
a little oversight, the Delaware Supreme Court again made some
noise (albeit only in dictum) about a more stringent duty of
care. 280 This pattern belies claims that courts are better than
legislatures or the market at protecting shareholders. 281
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D. Counter-Evidence: Shareholder Influence and Share Prices
Companies with strong shareholder protections have higher
share prices than companies with weak shareholder rights. 282 The
former also have superior operating perfonnance. 283 They invest
277. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591-92 (2003).
278. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-74 (Del. 1985).
279. In 1999, the Delaware Supreme Court said that directors breach the duty of
care only if their conduct is "so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it
seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith." Parnes v. Bally
Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542
A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988)); see also E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics
of Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control
Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2003) ("If the board's
decision or conduct is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director would
credit the decision or conduct, lack of good faith may, in some circumstances, be
inferred.").
280. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) ("[D]irectors' decisions will
be respected by courts unless the directors act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a
rational business purpose .... ").
281. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2000) (finding courts limited by
their reluctance to respond to political changes, their inability to set their own agendas,
and their constraints on justiciability).
282. For example, companies that opted out of Pennsylvania's extreme antitakeover
law were valued in the market at a multiple on cash flows 25% higher than companies
that did not opt out. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 250 n.5 (citing John Pound, On
Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to
the Pennsylvania Takeover Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 656, 668-69 (1992)).
283. See Lin, supra note 158, at 922 (citing empirical evidence that appointment of
outside directors positively impacts stock prices); Tod Perry & Anil Shivdasani, Do Boards
Affect Performance? Evidence from Corporate Restructuring, 78 J. Bus. 1403, 1418-20
(2005) (finding that firms without a majority of outside directors are more likely to
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more with more efficiency. 284 They have lower CEO compensation. 285
Further, countries with corporate laws that do not protect
shareholders tend to have weak stock markets. This suggests that
shareholder protections reduce agency costs. 286
When large shareholders do exert influence, they do not usurp
benefits for themselves; all shareholders gain from the activism of
large shareholders. Initiatives undertaken by CalPERS, for
instance, have generated superior market returns. 287 The presence
of large block holders often improves firm performance. 288 High

initiate asset restructurings and employee layoffs and that the reduction in the scale of
operations is larger for these firms than for other firms and that such firms are more
likely to improve performance after a restructuring); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L.
Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance 13 (Mar. 20, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=814205 (finding that
several proshareholder governance criteria are associated with higher returns on equity
and on assets); Henry Huang, Shareholder Rights and the Cost of Equity Capital29 (Aug.
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) ("My findings indicate that the
level of shareholder rights is significantly associated with the cost of equity capital.
Investors perceive the weak shareholder rights as an important source of potential agency
costs and demand higher rates of return accordingly."); see also John E. Core et al., Does
Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating
Performance and Investors' Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 659-61 (2006) (stating that
securities analysts weigh shareholder rights when making earnings forecasts).
284. See B!<lhren et al., supra note 140, at 2, 3, 18 ("[B]etter governance improves
investment efficiency by mitigating the underinvestment problem [and] the
overinvestment problem ... relative to the first best solution .... ").
285. See Jiraporn et al., supra note 213, at 248 ("[W]ealrer shareholder rights (more
suppressive governance) are related to higher executive pay.").
286. There is some question whether strong (or weak) governance causes superior (or
inferior) performance. "It is also possible that the results are driven by some unobservable
firm characteristic." Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118
Q.J. ECON. 107, 145 (2003). A recent empirical study suggests that is the case. N.K
Chidambaran et al., Does Better Corporate Governance "Cause" Better Firm
Performance? 43-44 (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891556. Laws that protect investors are associated with higher
national economic growth. Rui Castro et al., Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and
Economic Growth, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004).
287. See MONKS & MINow, supra note 67, at 157 (citing Stephen L. Nesbitt, Long
Term Rewards from Corporate Governance, Wilshire Assocs. (Jan. 5, 1994)); Mark Anson
et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS Focus List, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
102, 103-05 (2003); Brad M. Barber, Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS'
Shareholder Activism 2 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=890321 (finding that CalPERS's activism resulted in total wealth
creation of $3.1 billion between 1992 and 2005); see also MONKS & MINOW, supra note 67,
at 157 (discussing other examples of similar increase in shareholder value from actions at
Sears, Roebuck, and Honeywell); Meet the Friendly Corporate Raiders, Bus. WK., Sept. 20,
2004, at 102 (describing success of Relational Investing fund in pressuring
underperforming companies to change).
288. See ROE, supra note 119, at 237-38 (arguing that block-holders' presence
personifies the shareholders, which spurs executive performance, promotes ''loyalty," and
discourages "shirking''); Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and
Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229, 229-30 (2001) (finding higher stock returns between
1980 and 1996 for companies with large institutional ownership).

)
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institutional stock ownership is not associated with decreases in
R&D. 289 Strong shareholders may even benefit bondholders. 290

E. Counter-Evidence: Leveraged Buyouts and Acquisitions
f

There is much debate about the source of premiums in
291
acquisitions, but most commentators believe that some or most
of them stem from eliminating the large agency costs of the
separation of ownership and control. 292 In leveraged buyouts
("LEOs") a private group acquires a public company, typically
paying a large premium for its stock. 293 Neither the direct costs of
being a public company (like the costs of proxy statements and
SEC filings) nor the tax savings of high leverage explain these
premiums. 294 What does? Michael Jensen posits that going
private removes huge agency costs that beset public firms. 295 On
one hand, the high debt of LBO firms poses a threat of default
that deters managers from the waste that plagues many public
companies. 296 On the other hand, managers of LBO firms usually
own a large share of the equity, which gives them strong
incentives to increase share value. 297 As a result, LEOs improve
.
298
effi c1ency.
289.
See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INvESTMENTS 6-7 (1985).
290.
See Angie Low et al., The Impact of Shareholder Power on Bondholders:
Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions 9, 37-38 (Mar. 13, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891683 (showing that high
institutional ownership is positively related to bondholder returns of the acquiring
company in acquisitions).
See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 617-22 (noting that there is no unified theory
291.
on the source of high premiums in merger and acquisition transactions).
292.
See id. at 617-20.
293.
See DALE A OESTERLE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 27-28 (2d
ed. 2006) (describing method for performing a leveraged buyout).
294.
See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 202, at 404-06.
295.
See Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.Oct. 1989, at 61 ('The publicly held corporation ... has outlived its usefulness in many
sectors of the economy ... [because of] the central weakness of the public corporationthe conflict between owners and managers over the control and use of corporate
resources .... "). Although public ownership will not disappear, the LBO trend continues.
Id. at 62-66.
296.
See Jensen, supra note 142, at 322-23.
297.
Managers of LBO firms often own 15-20% of the equity. Id. at 323. This
contrasts with the one-fourth of 1% of the equity owned by the average CEO of a Fortune
500 company. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
298.
See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on
Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 165, 165-67, 184-93
(1990) (finding higher productivity after an LBO and that this result was not attributable
to reduced research and development, wages, capital investment, or layoffs of blue collar
workers); see also Richard Harris et al., Assessing the Impact of Management Buyouts on
Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United Kingdom, 87 REV. ECON. &
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The existence of acquisitions (including LEOs) also helps to
explain why the market has not demanded shareholder primacy.
Unlike public shareholders, an acquirer has no collective action
problem; it captures all the gains from improving corporate
governance. Accordingly, it makes sense that a sophisticated
investor who sees inefficient govemance would not wage a proxy
fight for control of public companies or seek IPOs by companies
with better governance. By those steps, the investor would incur
large costs (of investigation in the case of IPOs, or of a proxy
solicitation) but reap little gain. It makes more sense for
shareholders to wait for an offer of a premium by an acquirer
who can take control and keep all the remaining gains. 299
V. GOTTERDAMMERUNG: TRENDS ERODING DIRECTOR PRilVIACY

A. Growing Shareholder Activism
Economic and legal trends are increasing shareholder
power. 300 Pace the DPM theorists, shareholders did not choose
301
impotence; it was forced on them. Now they are gaining power,
albeit slowly. 302 High-profile merger disasters and corporate
STAT. 148, 152-53 (2005) (making similar findings in the U.K); Shaker A. Zahra,
Corporate Entrepreneurship and Financial Performance: The Case of Management and
Leveraged Buyouts, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 225, 238 (1995) (finding significant increases in
new product development and other aspects of corporate entrepreneurship after LEOs).
299.
This is not to say that LEOs entirely solve the problem of CEO domination.
[M]aybe it's that [LEOs] are often done with the help of the acquired entity,
where the managers know exactly how to change the company and make it
worth more, but want to put that knowledge to work only if they can reap
immense rewards from the repair job. That often seems to be what's happening.
Ben Stein, What Is This Thing Called Private Equity?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 3, at 6.
300. See William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order
Deserves a Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton's Vision of the Corporate
Law, 60 Bus. LAw. 1383, 1395 (2005) (stating that increasing product competition and the
growing power of institutional investors and securities markets are forcing changes in
corporate governance).
301. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (concerning executive compensation
consultants); supra notes 208-43 and accompanying text (describing obstacles to
shareholder control).
302. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: }'yfaking Institutional Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 175 (2001)
("Institutional investors have, in the past decade, increasingly engaged in corporate
governance activities .... "). Shareholder proposals are gaining greater support. With
growing frequency managements substantially accept them. For example, rules requiring
a majority (rather than a plurality) shareholder vote for the election of directors are being
adopted at "breathtaking speed." See Denise F. Brown, Study Shows Majority Voting
Continue to Gain Momentum, 5 BNA CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP'T 190, 190 (Feb. 23,
2007). This shows that "in the battle between owners and managers ... investors are
gaining power." Jena McGregor, Activist Investors Get /yfore Respect, Bus. WK., June 11,
2007, at 34.
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scandals "have made shareholders more cynical about the
decision-making process of boards of directors." 303 The SEC's 1992
proxy rule changes also made it easier for institutional investors
304
to communicate and cooperate. A recent court decision may
foster further shareholder involvement in board elections. 305
There is continuing growth in the fraction of public stocks held
by institutional investors generally and by public pension funds
and other institutions that are less subject to pressure from
306
corporate managers.
Hedge funds have grown, and their activism in corporate
governance is more intense and goes further than that of other
307
institutional investors. Hedge funds band together and recruit
other institutional investors for group action. 308 They often "try to
persuade managers to change the capital structure of the
company (typically to pay substantial dividends, repurchase
shares, or take on additional debt) in ways the hedge funds
believe will maximize the value of shares."309 They have been so
successful as to "supportD the proposition that they have shifted
the balance of corporate power in the direction of outside
shareholders and their fmancial agendas ... [perhaps heralding]
a modification of the prevailing description of a separation of
. and cont ro1 .... ~
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303. Young, supra note 123.
304.
See Briggs, supra note 15.2, at 686-89.
305.
See Am. Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462
F. 3d 121, 125, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006) (ordering inclusion on company's proxy statement of
shareholder proposals relating to elections of directors generally).
306.
In 1965, institutional investors held 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001 they held
61%. See SEC. INDUS. AsS'N, SECURITIES lNDUSTRYFACTBOOK2002, at 66 (2002).
307. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 123, at 4-18. This is a result of different
economic incentives and lower regulatory constraints and conflicts of interest. I d. at 1925; see also Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 156, at 43 (stating that "hedge fund corporate
governance activism is more robust"); Young, supra note 123 (describing growing
leadership by hedge funds to oppose value-impairing deals in proxy votes and noting that,
because of their fee structures, hedge fund managers "maintain a laser focus on
shareholder value").
308. See Briggs, supra note 152, at 690-92, 697-98 (describing "wolf pack tactics").
309.
Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 156, at 35.
310. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
1409 (2007); see also Briggs, supra note 152, at 721 ("[H]edge funds with significant
shareholdings have been able to use wolf-pack tactics against companies to achieve at
least some oftheir aims.").
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Investor sophistication is rising, 311 making it easier for
shareholders to coordinate and raising the payoff to activism by
increasing the power they can exert if they do cooperate.
Investors and regulators are paying more attention to proxy
voting by fiduciaries. "Today, institutional shareholders who
consistently defer to management (the modus operandi of the
past) may be accused of abdicating their fiduciary duties." 312 It is
now harder for managers to intimidate shareholders who vote
against them. In sum, the incentives for shareholder initiative
are growing. This rising activism has already benefited firms'
performance and share values; 313 as the trend continues, the
benefits should also grow.
Both a cause and an effect of mounting shareholder energy is
the growth of shareholder advisory organizations and lobbying
groups. The foremost is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),
which may guide over a third of the shareholder votes. 314 A
similar organization, International Corporate Governance
Network (ICGN), now operates transnationally. 315 These advisors
have a significant impact on proxy votes. 316
ISS has also created its Corporate Governance Quotient,
which rates the corporate governance systems of public
companies. 317 The Council of Institutional Investors also
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311. See Angela Morgan et al., The Evolution of Shareholder Voting for Executive
Compensation Schemes, 21 J. CORP. FIN. 715, 715, 723 (2006) (concluding that
"shareholders have become more sensitive to potentially harmful [executive
compensation] plan provisions"); Rock, supra note 116, at 447-51 (describing examples of
informed activism by institutional shareholders).
312. Young, wpra note 123.
313. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text; see also Romano, supra note
302, at 183 (stating that institutional investors have targeted poorly performing
corporations).
314. See Dean Starkman, A Proxy Adviser's Two Sides: Some Question Work of ISS
for Companies It Scrutinizes, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at Dl. According to its
president, 15-20% of ISS clients automatically vote according to ISS reconnendations.
Id.; see also Briggs, supra note 152, at 692-93, 698-99 (describing the operations and
effectiveness of ISS). Glass, Lewis & Co. also offers research and advice to institutional
investors. See Glass, Lewis & Co., Board Accountability Index, http://www.glasslewis.com/
solutions/bai.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2007); see also Rose, supra note 245, at 904
(describing services offered by Glass, Lewis, & Co. and explaining the functions of the
Board Accountability Index).
315. See Rose, supra note 245, at 897.
316. See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of Institutional and
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. J. 29, 30, 34 (2002); see
also TONELLO, supra note 146, at 24 ("Recently, these organizations have focused
increasing attention on what they consider to be unjustified and excessive compensation,
thereby contributing to raising the 'best practice' bar.").
317. See Rose, wpra note 245, at 900-03; Institutional Shareholder Services, Rating
Criteria, http://www.isscgq.com/RatingCriteria.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (listing
sixty-one rating criteria used in the CGQ). An index of twenty-four of these features
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318

publishes corporate governance guidelines. Governance Metrics
International (GMI) and the Corporate Library CCL) also rate the
governance structures of public companies. 319 Going farther, some
institutional investors are joining forces to participate directly in
corporate governance. 320 Shareholder activism will be facilitated
by organizations like the new Investors for Director
Accountability, which plans to coordinate institutional
shareholders in order to "press directors to act in the interests of
321
the stockholders."
Some objections are leveled at these organizations. One is
that ISS has a conflict of interest because, in addition to the
foregoing activities, it offers advice to public companies,
"which creates a concern that ISS'[s] recommendations in a
proxy matter may be affected by whether or not the subject
company purchases other services from ISS, such as
governance advice." 322 It is also charged that the ratings of
these organizations
"do
not
reliably
predict
firm
,323
perf ormance.
These concerns are not fanciful. Conflicts of interest are
ubiquitous m corporate governance, infecting not only
directors, but also accountants, investment advisors,
compensation
advisors,
and
institutional
investors
themselves. 324 It would almost be surprising to find an aspect of
corporate governance in which there are no conflicts of

relating to shareholder power has been found to be positively associated with several
measures of superior corporate performance. See Gompers et al., supra note 286, at 14550.
318.
See COUNCJL OF INSTITUTIONAL INvESTORS, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE POLICillS
(2006), http://www.cii.org/policies/Current%20CII%20Corporate%20Governance%20
Policies%2003-20.-07. pdf.
319.
See GovernanceMetrics International, Overview, http://www.gmiratings.com
!hgwaa055h0jyiu55scbird45)/About.aspx#top (last visited Oct. 19, 2007); see also Rose,
supra note 245, at 903-04 (discussing GMI and CL).
320. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus. WK., Feb.
20, 2006, at 72 (describing coordinated efforts, including the seeking of board seats). In
some cases shareholders have formed groups to help explain the complex, abstruse
financial information disclosed by public companies. See Gretchen Morgenson, Hear Ye,
Hear Ye: Corralling Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, § 3, at 1 (describing
formation of group ofVerizon Communications shareholders).
321. Gretchen Morgenson, Fund Manager, It's Time to Pick a Side, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2006, § 3, at 1.
322. Rose, supra note 245, at 906.
323. Id. at 908; see also Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading
Myths of Bad Metrics, AcAD. OF MGMT. EXEC., Feb. 2004, at 108, 108 (claiming that
ratings are based on "Wall Street superstitions" and "cliches and myths, rather than on
genuine research").
324. See supra notes 249-50, 266 and accompanying text (concerning investment
advisors).
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interest. However, recent studies find a significant correlation
between at least some of these agencies' ratings factors and
corporate performance. 325 No doubt further research can
improve these correlations. There is room for disagreement
about the criterion by which correlation should be sought. 326
However, the widespread use of the services of these
organizations by institutional investors indicates powerfully
that they find the services beneficial.
The market is already addressing these conflicts of
interest. 327 If the market cannot solve the problems, regulation
may be needed, 328 although regulation is always costly and not
always beneficial. Given the recent effectiveness of ratings and
advisory services in aiding shareholders, nothing should be done
to hamper their continued growth.
More shareholder proposals are gaining majority
shareholder support. 329 Boards once routinely ignored them. 330
Now they pay more heed and implement more shareholderapproved proposals. 331 ''Vote No" campaigns in which disgruntled
shareholders withhold their votes for some or all board nominees
increase the odds of CEO turnover (which usually raises share
price), even though these campaigns do not directly alter board
composition. 332 Shareholder pressure to declassify boards and to
remove poison pills is increasingly successful. 333 New regulations
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325. See supra notes 212, 282 and accompanying text.
326.
Various studies have used return on equity, return on assets, accounting
profitability, and cost of capital. See supra notes 212-14, 223-25 and accompanying text
(referring to various measures of corporate performance).
327.
Rose, supra note 245, at 907 ("[L]arge, institutional investors ... have raised
concerns and, in some cases, switched advisors over conflicts issue.").
328. See id. at 919-26 (discussing the possibility of regulation).
329. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting the growing success of
shareholder opposition to anti takeover devices).
330. See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 237, at 370-71.
331.
See id. at 369.
332. See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional
Investors 'Just Vote No'?: CEO and Director Turnover Associated with Shareholder
Activism
1-2,
23
(2006)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://ssm.com/abstract=575242.
333.
See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 237, at 377-79 ("The number of [poison] pill
redemptions and board declassifications increased substantially in 2004."). One study
found that, of fifty companies that had approved a (precatory) shareholder proposal to
declassify the board between 2004 and 2005, fifteen (30%) did so. Ganor, supra note 62, at
14. More boards are responding to shareholder pressure to remove poison pills despite
management opposition to removal. See Ali C. Akyol & Carolyn A. Carroll, Removing
Poison Pills: A Case of Shareholder Activism 9-13 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstrct=935950.
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that enhance board oversight seem to have caused a reduction in
CEO compensation. 334
More shareholders are proposing by-law amendments. 335
Hitherto shareholders typically braved only precatory proposals,
which boards regularly disregarded. By-law amendments are still
imperfect tools; by-laws cannot achieve many protections
investors need, and some companies require unattainable
supermajority votes to amend the by-laws. 336 Still, this tactic
allows investors to take one more step forward. If they are again
frustrated, they will seek other means to defend themselves.

B. Growing Competition for Capital
"[I]n order to compete for capital, corporations will have to
give investors more of a role in governance."337 In America, the
huge advantage that public equities once enjoyed over other
investments is shrinking, and that trend is likely to continue.
One growing competitor is private equity. 338 DPMtrPM advocates
are so baffled by this development that they offer stmmingly
obtuse explanations for it. Lynn Stout says, "The recent boom in
private equity buyouts suggests that the modern trend toward
greater shareholder power and protection has already gone too
far." 339 "[P]ublic shareholders may have made themselves so
bothersome that many corporate managers simply do not want to
deal with them." 340 It's unclear whether the recognition that the
managers, not the directors, are calling the shots is a conscious
confession or a slip of the pen.
In any case, a much more persuasive explanation for the
trend is available: Through venture capital and leveraged
buyouts, large investors can escape the abuse they suffer in
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334.
See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, CEO Compensation and Board
Structure 19 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=901642 (finding that firms that had not previously complied with the new rules
decreased their CEO compensation by 20-25% upon compliance compared to firms that
were already complying).
335.
See Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism's Latest Weapon, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 4, 2006, at Cl.
336.
See id.
337.
MONKS & MINOW, supra note 67, at 156.
338.
See William J. Holstein, The Rising Role Of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2006, § 3, at 9 (interviewing Robert F. Bruner, Dean of the Darden School of Business at
the University of Virginia, about the role of private equity firms in merger and acquisition
transactions).
339.
Lynn A. Stout, Democracy by Proxy, WALL ST. J., March 8, 2007, at A16.
340.
Lynn A. Stout, Investors Who Are Too Bolshy for Their Own Good, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2007, at 9.

1270

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[44:5

20

public companies and exert real control. This is a primary motive
for the growth of private equity. 341
Foreign firms and securities markets are also becoming
more competitive. America still compares favorably to other
countries as a place to invest. "In fact, the U.S. [stock] market
has generated retums at least as high as those of the European
and Pacific markets" in every five-year period in the last twentyfive years. 342 However, we cannot be complacent. Better
shareholder protection is making many countries more appealing
to investors. 343 Now, "the law on shareholder protection in the US
is weaker than the law [of several other countries]."344 Americans
are investing more of their money overseas. 345
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C. Stakeholders and Social Responsibility Under Shareholder
Primacy

p

Increasing shareholder power poses no threat to stakeholders
(other than CEOs). Pursuit of profit motivates shareholders to treat

d
'I
n

341. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Symposium on Corporate Elections 17 (N at'l Center
of Econ. Res., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 448, Nov. 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstact=471640 (claiming that excessive executive compensation in public
companies in effect imposes a 10% annual tax on shareholder and offering this as an
explanation for the growth of private equity).
342.
Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 180, at 9. The performance was not limited to
financial markets: from 1992 to 2000, "growth in GDP per capita was greater in the U.S.
than in France, Germany, Great Britain, or Japan." Id. at 10.
343.
See Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17, 30-33, 43 (2007) (concluding, through the use of
"leximetrics," that Germany, France, United Kingdom, and India have stronger
shareholder protection laws than the United States); Eric Pan, Why the World No Longer
Puts Its Stock in Us 1-3, 11-12 (Benjamin N .. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
176, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=951705 (stating that U.S. markets are no
longer unique; foreign competition is growing and fewer foreign companies are using U.S.
equity markets). In general, there is a world-wide trend toward the shareholder primacy
model. See Marc Goergen et al., Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL 'y 243, 243-44 (2005);
Kamar, supra note 50, at 1757-58 (describing a "trend toward shareholder protection" in
the European Union).
344.
Lele & Siems, supra note 343, at 43 (comparing the law of the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and India). Colin S. Melvin, director of corporate
govemance for a large British money manager, says that ''the U.S. is probably one of the most
difficult environments" for shareholders ''to work with companies to improve corporate
govemance." Gretchen Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2006, § 3, at 1. By measures developed by the World Bank, the United States now ranks below
average in investor protection. See SIMEON DJANKOV ET. AL, THE LAW AND EcONOMICS OF
SELF-DEALING 52-80 (2006), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/
Protecting-Investors-Self-Dealing.pdf; see also No Deomocracy, Please,
We're
Shareholders, THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 13 (stating that shareholder democracy is
weaker in the United States than in the United Kingdom).
345. See Pan, supra note 343, at 9-11.
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employees fairly. 346 Shareholder primacy would not increase
corporate lawbreaking. 347 Shareholder primacy could reduce
corporate philanthropy as directors become less free with the
shareholders' money. However, the decline should be minor"independent" boards tend to serve CEOs, not the public interest.
In fact, shareholder primacy will benefit society generally.
Rising corporate profits and dividends mean higher tax receipts.
Greater business efficiency and innovation will be pursued for
the benefit of shareholders, but through the "invisible hand" this
will expand the economy, bringing higher wages and better goods
348
and services at lower prices. Peter Kostant, a fan of the TPM,
discusses corporate governance in terms of Rawls's concept of
fairness. 349 Standing behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance," a rational
person would choose shareholder primacy over other governance
models because it benefits everyone (except CEOs). Kostant
decries the excessive political power of CE0s 350 and praises the
TPM's potential to curb CEOs. 351 In fact, "independent" boards do
not curb but magnify CEO power. Even progressives should
prefer shareholder primacy, which really reins in CEOs.

D. Shareholder Nominating Committees
A principal obstacle to shareholder primacy 1s that a
corporation's "official" nominees for election to the board are
chosen by a committee of incumbent directors. 352 Since most
boards are dominated by the CEO, most committees choose
nominees who, like themselves, accept CEO primacy. In this
system, legislation cannot create true board independence but
only reduce formal contacts.
346. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
34 7. There are a growing number of large private companies in which the board is
chosen by one or a few dominant shareholders. See supra note 338 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, all the recent scandals over false financials and back-dating and
spring-loading of executive stock options have involved public companies with a majority
of "independent" directors. See supra note 100. Director "independence" obviously does not
reduce law-breaking, and may increase it. See supra notes 158-82 and accompanying text.
348. See Michael Bradley et al., The Purpose and Accountability of the Corporation in
Contemporary Society, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 36-38 (1999) ("[M]aximizing the
residual claim of a public corporation in turn maximizes the clain!s of all
stakeholders ...."); Mcintosh, supra note 108, at 68 (stating that shareholder wealth
maximization is the goal that is ''likely, in the greatest number of cases to result in global
wealth maximization").
349. Kostant, supra note 2, at 698-99.
350. Id. at 680, 695.
351. Id. at 671.
352. See Cai et al., supra note 72, at 6 n.8 (''Under NYSE rules after SOX, the
nomination committee, comprised entirely of outside directors, is charged with identifYing
qualified board candidates.")
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The best way to make directors responsive to shareholders is
to have them chosen by the shareholders. Accordingly, I have
proposed that official nominees for the board be chosen by a
committee comprising the ten to twenty largest shareholders. 353 I
will not repeat my prior argument for this proposal, but merely
address concerns about it that might be intensified by the
growing power and activism of institutional investors. First, the
need to gain a majority vote on this committee for any nominee
would virtually preclude the selection of nominees expected to
serve the special wishes of one or a few shareholders (like a
union or state pension fund).
Could committee members plot a pump-and-dump scheme
in which their lackeys on the board have the firm spread
misleading news so as to raise its stock price and allow
committee members to sell their stock at an inflated price?
This would require cooperation from dozens of directors and
officers risking severe civil and criminal penalties, all of whom
would presumably demand rich compensation. Small incidents
of insider trading often go undetected, but a campaign of this
magnitude would be almost impossible to execute without
discovery. Knowing that only one conspirator would have to
blow their cover to inculpate all, prudent people would refuse
to help. More generally, the only corporate goal likely to
command support from a majority of the members of the
committee would be maximization of share price.
Individual committee members might hope to profit from
self-dealing. However, the interest of any director in a
transaction must be disclosed to the other directors. 354 Apart
from concerns about legality, directors would resist any action
that would injure their reputations and chances for more or
better directorships. In the current reign of CEO primacy,
directors polish their reputations by toadying to the CEO.
Under shareholder primacy, directors would cultivate a
reputation for serving investors by maximizing share value.
Efforts of committee members to extract inside information
from directors would fail for similar reasons.
Of course, corruption infects every system that relies on
fallible humans. With shareholder nominating committees,
however, self-dealing, insider trading, and stock manipulation
should be no greater than they are now, if only because the
logistics would be more complicated for committee members
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353. See Dent, supra note 169, at 67-75.
354. See CLARK, supra note 208, at 171-72 (stating that director must disclose at
least the underlying facts of a self-interested transaction).
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than they are for the inside officers who now dominate
corporations. Other problems, like excessive, poorly designed
executive compensation, perquisites, and management slack
should shrink under shareholder nominating committees. In
sum, the proposal offers to investors higher share prices and to
the overall economy greater efficiency and international
attraction of more capital.

VI. CONCLUSION
The director primacy and team production models of
corporate governance offer false descriptions of current realityindependent boards do not control most public corporations now,
CEOs do. CEO domination exacts a huge toll on stock values.
Some of this lost wealth is diverted to executives; much of it is
simply lost through inefficiency. Little or none of it trickles down
to other stakeholders.
The impotence of outside directors does not stem from
personal failings or from legislative neglect. Over many decades
laws have been amended repeatedly in an effort to increase board
independence, but these efforts have only removed formal
affiliations between managers and outside directors; they have
increased board independence little or not at all. Further
amendments are unlikely to be more successful. Accordingly, we
can either resign ourselves to CEO domination or transfer power
to shareholders. Shareholders want to maximize share value, a
goal that generally coincides with maximizing industrial
efficiency. Pursuit of that goal will generally benefit other
corporate constituencies and society as a whole. Certainly, it will
not make stakeholders worse off than they are now.
How can shareholder primacy be realized? We should at
least revise rules that hinder cooperation among shareholders
and accumulation of large blocks of stock. 355 Directors should be
more readily held accountable in shareholder litigation. 356 Good
directors will not be deterred from serving on boards or from
taking rational risks by rules expecting them to act with minimal
care and competence. Any legitimate concerns about frightening
them can be addressed by limiting the personal liability of
directors or eschewing it altogether and resorting to equitable
relief.

355. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying te».'i (discussing current hindrances
to shareholder suits).
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Ultimately, shareholders should have a major, if not
dominant, role in choosing the board. I have urged that nominees
for the board of each public company be chosen by a committee
comprising its largest shareholders. 357 Others have suggested
reforms that are more modest but point in the same direction. 356
For now, there should be a consensus to increase shareholder
influence. We cannot be certain of our final destination, the
precise recipe for optimal corporate governance, but we know the
general direction in which we should head.

357.
See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
358.
See MONKS & MINow, supra note 67, at 168 (urging the creation of shareholder
committees to "exercise control over the board's priorities and composition"); Bratton,
supra note 100, at 1337 (arguing there is a need for independently nominated directors);
William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small
State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 999-1000 (2003) (urging access to corporate proxy
machinery for insurgents with significant support); Gordon, supra note 100, at 1243
(proposing a new category of "trustee directors" for audit committees and certain other
roles); Rock, supra note 116, at 490-504 (describing and praising past use of shareholder
advisory committees). It is unclear, however, how effective more modest reforms are likely
to be. See MichaelS. Weisbach, Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A
Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation 14 (Nov. 14, 2006) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=939785 (disagreeing with Bebchuk and Fried's
argument that "managers effectively set their own pay subject to an outrage constraint").

